Official Interpretations

2(b) Attempt to communicate

1. Examples. Section 1006.2(b) defines an attempt to communicate as any act to initiate a communication or other contact about a debt with any person through any medium, including by soliciting a response from such person. An act to initiate a communication or other contact about a debt is an attempt to communicate regardless of whether the attempt, if successful, would be a communication that conveys information regarding a debt directly or indirectly to any person.

For example:

i. Assume that a debt collector places a telephone call to a person about a debt. Regardless of whether the debt collector reaches the person, the debt collector has attempted to communicate with the person.

ii. Assume that a debt collector places a telephone call to a person about a debt and leaves a voicemail message. Regardless of whether the voicemail message consists solely of a limited content message or includes content that conveys, directly or indirectly, information about a debt, the debt collector has attempted to communicate with the person.

Official Interpretation

2(d) Communicate or communication

1. Any medium. Section 1006.2(d) provides, in relevant part, that a communication can occur through any medium. “Any medium” includes any oral, written, electronic, or other medium. For example, a communication may occur in person or by telephone, audio recording, paper document, mail, email, text message, social media, or other electronic media.

2. Information regarding a debt. Section 1006.2(d) provides, in relevant part, that a communication means conveying information regarding a debt. A debt collector does not convey information regarding a debt directly or indirectly to any person if the debt collector leaves only a limited-content message, as defined in § 1006.2(j). A debt collector who provides marketing or advertising that does not contain information about a specific debt or debts has not communicated under § 1006.2(d), even if the debt collector transmits the marketing or advertising message to a consumer, because the debt collector has not conveyed information regarding a debt.

Official Interpretation

2(h) Debt.

1. Consumer. Section 1006.2(h) defines debt to mean, in part, any obligation or alleged obligation of a consumer to pay money arising out of a transaction. Section 1006.2(e), in turn, defines consumer to mean any natural person obligated or allegedly obligated to pay any debt. Only natural persons, therefore, can incur debts as defined in § 1006.2(h).

Official Interpretation

2(i) Debt collector.

1. In general. Section 1006.2(i) provides, in part, that a debt collector is any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or mail in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due, or asserted to be owed or due, to another. A person who collects or attempts to collect defaulted debts that the person has purchased, but who does not collect or attempt to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due, or asserted to be owed or due, to another, and who does not have a business the principal purpose of which is the collection of debts, is not a debt collector as defined in § 1006.2(i).

Official Interpretation

2(j) Limited-content message.

1. In general. Section 1006.2(j) provides that a limited-content message is a voicemail message for a consumer that includes all of the content described in § 1006.2(j)(1), that may include any of the content described in § 1006.2(j)(2), and that includes no other content. Any other message is not a limited-content message. If a voicemail message includes content other than the specific items described in § 1006.2(j)(1) and (2), and such other content directly or indirectly conveys any information about a debt, the message is a communication, as defined in § 1006.2(d). For example, a voicemail message that includes a statement that the message is from a debt collector and a request to speak to a particular consumer is not a limited-content message because it includes more than the required or permitted content.

2. Message for a consumer. Section 1006.2(j) provides, in part, that a limited-content message is a voicemail message for a consumer. A message knowingly left for a third party is not a limited-content message because it is not for a consumer. For example, assume that a debt collector has a telephone number that the debt collector knows belongs to the consumer’s friend. A voicemail message left after calling that number is not a limited-content message, even if the message includes no more than the content described in § 1006.2(j)(1) and (2) because the debt collector knowingly left the message for someone other than the consumer. Other provisions of this part may, in certain circumstances, restrict a debt collector from leaving a limited-content message or otherwise attempting to communicate with a consumer. See §§ 1006.6(b) and (c) and 1006.22(f) and their related commentary for further guidance regarding when a debt collector is prohibited from attempting to communicate with a consumer.

3. Meaningful disclosure of identity. A debt collector who leaves only a limited-content message for a consumer does not violate § 1006.14(g)’s requirement to meaningfully disclose the caller’s identity with respect to that voicemail message.

2(j)(1) Required content.

1. Example. The following example illustrates a limited-content message that includes only the content described in § 1006.2(j)(1): “This is Robin Smith calling from ABC Inc. Please contact me or Jim Johnson at 1-800-555-1212.”

2(j)(2) Optional content.

1. In general. Section 1006.2(j)(2)(iv) provides that a limited-content message may include a statement that, if the consumer replies, the consumer may speak to any of the company’s representatives or associates. A message that includes a more detailed description of the representative or associate group is not a limited-content message. For example, a reference to an agent with the “credit card receivables group” is not a limited-content message because it includes more than a statement that the consumer’s reply may be answered by a representative or associate.

2. Example. The following example illustrates a limited-content message that includes the content described in both § 1006.2(j)(1) and (2): “Hi, this is Robin Smith calling from ABC Inc. It is 4:15 p.m. on Wednesday, September 1. Please contact me or any of our representatives at 1-800-555-1212 today until 6:00 p.m. Eastern time, or any weekday from 8:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. Eastern time.”

Official Interpretation

6(a) Consumer.

Paragraph 6(a)(1)

1. Spouse. Section 1006.6(a)(1) provides that, for purposes of § 1006.6, the term consumer includes a consumer’s spouse. The surviving spouse of a deceased consumer is a spouse as that term is used in § 1006.6(a)(1).

Paragraph 6(a)(2).

1. Parent. Section 1006.6(a)(2) provides that, for purposes of § 1006.6, the term consumer includes a consumer’s parent, if the consumer is a minor. A parent of a deceased minor consumer is a parent as that term is used in § 1006.6(a)(2).

Paragraph 6(a)(4).

1. Personal representative. Section 1006.6(a)(4) provides that, for purposes of § 1006.6, the term consumer includes the executor or administrator of the consumer’s estate, if the consumer is deceased. The terms executor or administrator include the personal representative of the consumer’s estate. A personal representative is any person who is authorized to act on behalf of the deceased consumer’s estate. Persons with such authority may include personal representatives under the informal probate and summary administration procedures of many States, persons appointed as universal successors, persons who sign declarations or affidavits to effectuate the transfer of estate assets, and persons who dispose of the deceased consumer’s financial assets or other assets of monetary value extrajudicially.

Official Interpretation

6(b) Communications with a consumer.

6(b)(1) Prohibitions regarding unusual or inconvenient times or places.

1. Designation of inconvenience. Section 1006.6(b)(1) prohibits a debt collector from, among other things, communicating or attempting to communicate with a consumer in connection with the collection of any debt at a time or place that the debt collector knows or should know is inconvenient to the consumer, unless an exception in § 1006.6(b)(4) applies. For example, a debt collector knows or should know that a time or place is inconvenient to a consumer if the consumer uses the word “inconvenient” to notify the debt collector. In addition, depending on the facts and circumstances, the debt collector knows or should know that a time or place is inconvenient even if the consumer does not specifically state to the debt collector that a time or place is “inconvenient.” The debt collector may ask follow-up questions regarding whether a time or place is convenient to clarify statements by the consumer. For example:

i. Assume that a creditor places a debt for collection with a debt collector. To facilitate collection of the debt, the creditor provides the debt collector a file that includes recent notes stating that the consumer cannot be disturbed on Tuesdays and Thursdays through the end of the calendar year. Based on these facts, the debt collector knows or should know that Tuesdays and Thursdays through the end of the calendar year are inconvenient to the consumer. Unless the consumer informs the debt collector that those times are no longer inconvenient, § 1006.6(b)(1)(i) prohibits the debt collector from communicating or attempting to communicate with the consumer on those days through the end of the calendar year.

ii. Assume that a debt collector calls a consumer. The consumer answers the call but states “I am busy” or “I cannot talk now.” The debt collector asks the consumer when would be a convenient time. The consumer responds, “on weekdays, except from 3:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m.” The debt collector asks the consumer whether there would be a convenient time on weekends. The consumer responds “no.” Based on these facts, the debt collector knows or should know that the time period between 3:00 p.m. and 5:00 p.m. on weekdays, and all times on weekends, are inconvenient to the consumer. Thereafter, unless the consumer informs the debt collector that those times are no longer inconvenient, § 1006.6(b)(1)(i) prohibits the debt collector from communicating or attempting to communicate with the consumer at those times.

iii. Assume that a consumer tells a debt collector not to communicate with the consumer at a particular place, such as the consumer’s home. The debt collector asks whether the consumer intends to prohibit the debt collector from communicating with the consumer through all media associated with the consumer’s home, including, for example, mail. Absent such additional information, the debt collector knows or should know that communications to the consumer at home, including mail to the consumer’s home address and calls to the consumer’s home landline telephone number, are inconvenient. Thereafter, unless the consumer informs the debt collector that the place is no longer inconvenient, § 1006.6(b)(1)(ii) prohibits the debt collector from communicating or attempting to communicate with the consumer at the consumer’s home. See comment 6(b)(1)(ii)–1 for additional guidance regarding communications or attempts to communicate at an inconvenient place.

2. Consumer-initiated communication. If a consumer initiates a communication with a debt collector at a time or from a place that the consumer previously designated as inconvenient, the debt collector may respond once at that time or place through the same medium of communication used by the consumer. (For more on medium of communication, see § 1006.14(h) and its associated commentary.) After that response, § 1006.6(b)(1) prohibits the debt collector from communicating or attempting to communicate further with the consumer at that time or place until the consumer conveys that the time or place is no longer inconvenient, unless an exception in § 1006.6(b)(4) applies. For example:

i. Assume the same facts as in comment 6(b)(1)–1.ii, except that, after the consumer tells the debt collector that weekdays from 3:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. and weekends are inconvenient, the consumer sends an email message to the debt collector at 3:30 p.m. on Wednesday. Based on these facts, § 1006.6(b)(1)(i) does not prohibit the debt collector from responding once by email message before 5:00 p.m. on that day. Unless the consumer informs the debt collector that those times are no longer inconvenient, § 1006.6(b)(1)(i) prohibits the debt collector from future communications or attempts to communicate with the consumer on weekdays between 3:00 p.m. and 5:00 p.m. and on weekends. Additionally, if the consumer responds to the debt collector’s email message, the debt collector may continue to respond once to each consumer-initiated email message before 5:00 p.m. on that day.

ii. Assume the same facts as in comment 6(b)(1)–1.iii, except that, after the consumer tells the debt collector not to communicate with the consumer at home, the consumer calls the debt collector from the consumer’s home landline telephone number. Based on these facts, § 1006.6(b)(1)(ii) does not prohibit the debt collector from responding once by communicating with the consumer on that telephone call. Unless the consumer informs the debt collector that the place is no longer inconvenient, § 1006.6(b)(1)(ii) prohibits the debt collector from future communications or attempts to communicate with the consumer at home.

iii. Assume that a consumer tells a debt collector that all communications to the consumer on Friday every week are inconvenient to the consumer. On a Friday, the consumer visits the debt collector’s website and uses the debt collector’s mobile application. Based on these facts, while the consumer navigates the website or uses the mobile application, § 1006.6(b)(1)(i) does not prohibit the debt collector from conveying information to the consumer about the debt through the website or mobile application. Once the consumer stops navigating the website or using the mobile application, however, § 1006.6(b)(1)(i) prohibits the debt collector from further communications or attempts to communicate on that day. And unless the consumer informs the debt collector that those times are no longer inconvenient, § 1006.6(b)(1)(i) prohibits the debt collector from future communications or attempts to communicate with the consumer on Fridays.

iv. Assume the same facts as in comment 6(b)(1)–2.iii, except that after the consumer visits the debt collector’s website and uses the debt collector’s mobile application, the consumer sends an email message to the debt collector at 8:30 p.m. on Friday. Based on these facts, § 1006.6(b)(1)(i) does not prohibit the debt collector from responding once, such as by sending an automated email message reply generated in response to the consumer’s email message. Unless the consumer informs the debt collector that those times are no longer inconvenient, § 1006.6(b)(1)(i) prohibits the debt collector from future communications or attempts to communicate with the consumer on Fridays.

Paragraph 6(b)(1)(i).

1. Time of electronic communication. Section 1006.6(b)(1)(i) prohibits a debt collector from communicating or attempting to communicate, including through electronic communication media, at any unusual time, or at a time that the debt collector knows or should know is inconvenient to the consumer. For purposes of determining the time of an electronic communication, such as an email or text message, under § 1006.6(b)(1)(i), an electronic communication occurs when the debt collector sends it, not, for example, when the consumer receives or views it.

2. Consumer’s location. Under § 1006.6(b)(1)(i), in the absence of a debt collector’s knowledge of circumstances to the contrary, an inconvenient time for communicating with a consumer is before 8:00 a.m. and after 9:00 p.m. local time at the consumer’s location. If a debt collector has conflicting or ambiguous information regarding a consumer’s location, then, in the absence of knowledge of circumstances to the contrary, the debt collector complies with § 1006.6(b)(1)(i) if the debt collector communicates or attempts to communicate with the consumer at a time that would be convenient in all of the locations at which the debt collector’s information indicates the consumer might be located. The following examples, which assume that the debt collector has no information about times the consumer considers inconvenient or other information about the consumer’s location, illustrate the rule.

i. Assume that a debt collector’s information indicates that a consumer has a mobile telephone number with an area code associated with the Eastern time zone and a residential address in the Pacific time zone. The convenient times to communicate with the consumer are after 11:00 a.m. Eastern time (8:00 a.m. Pacific time) and before 9:00 p.m. Eastern time (6:00 p.m. Pacific time).

ii. Assume that a debt collector’s information indicates that a consumer has a mobile telephone number with an area code associated with the Eastern time zone and a landline telephone number with an area code associated with the Mountain time zone. The convenient times to communicate with the consumer are after 10:00 a.m. Eastern time (8:00 a.m. Mountain time) and before 9:00 p.m. Eastern time (7:00 p.m. Mountain time).

Paragraph 6(b)(1)(ii).

1. Communications or attempts to communicate at unusual or inconvenient places. Section 1006.6(b)(1)(ii) prohibits a debt collector from communicating or attempting to communicate with a consumer in connection with the collection of any debt at any unusual place, or at a place that the debt collector knows or should know is inconvenient to the consumer. Some communication media, such as mailing addresses and landline telephone numbers, are associated with a place. Pursuant to § 1006.6(b)(1)(ii), a debt collector must not communicate or attempt to communicate with a consumer through media associated with an unusual place, or with a place that the debt collector knows or should know is inconvenient to the consumer. Other communication media, such as email addresses and mobile telephone numbers, are not associated with a place. Section 1006.6(b)(1)(ii) does not prohibit a debt collector from communicating or attempting to communicate with a consumer through such media unless the debt collector knows that the consumer is at an unusual place, or at a place that the debt collector knows or should know is inconvenient to the consumer. For example:

i. Assume the same facts as in comment 6(b)(1)–1.iii. Unless the debt collector knows that the consumer is at home, a telephone call to the consumer’s mobile telephone number or an electronic communication, including, for example, an email message or a text message to the consumer’s mobile telephone, does not violate § 1006.6(b)(1)(ii) even if the consumer receives or views the communication while at home.

6(b)(2) Prohibitions regarding consumer represented by an attorney.

1. Consumer-initiated communications. A consumer-initiated communication from a consumer represented by an attorney constitutes the consumer’s prior consent to that communication under § 1006.6(b)(4)(i); therefore, a debt collector may respond to that consumer-initiated communication. However, the consumer’s act of initiating the communication does not negate the debt collector’s knowledge that the consumer is represented by an attorney and does not revoke the protections afforded the consumer under § 1006.6(b)(2). After the debt collector’s response, the debt collector must not communicate or attempt to communicate further with the consumer unless the debt collector knows the consumer is not represented by an attorney with respect to the debt, either based on information from the consumer or the consumer’s attorney, or unless an exception under § 1006.6(b)(2)(i) or (ii) or § 1006.6(b)(4) applies.

6(b)(3) Prohibitions regarding consumer’s place of employment.

1. Communications at consumer’s place of employment. Section 1006.6(b)(3) prohibits a debt collector from communicating or attempting to communicate with a consumer in connection with the collection of any debt at the consumer’s place of employment, if the debt collector knows or has reason to know that the consumer’s employer prohibits the consumer from receiving such communication. A debt collector knows or has reason to know that a consumer’s employer prohibits the consumer from receiving such communication if, for example, the consumer tells the debt collector that the consumer cannot take personal calls at work. The debt collector may ask follow-up questions regarding the employer’s prohibitions or limitations on contacting the consumer at the place of employment to clarify statements by the consumer.

2. Employer-provided email. For special rules regarding employer-provided email addresses, see § 1006.22(f)(3) and its associated commentary.

6(b)(4) Exceptions.

Paragraph 6(b)(4)(i).

1. Prior consent—in general. Section 1006.6(b)(4)(i) provides, in part, that the prohibitions in § 1006.6(b)(1) through (3) on a debt collector communicating or attempting to communicate with a consumer in connection with the collection of any debt do not apply if the debt collector communicates or attempts to communicate with the prior consent of the consumer. If the debt collector learns during a communication that the debt collector is communicating with the consumer at an inconvenient time or place, for example, the debt collector may ask the consumer during that communication what time or place would be convenient. However, § 1006.6(b)(4)(i) prohibits the debt collector from asking the consumer to consent to the continuation of that inconvenient communication.

2. Directly to the debt collector. Section 1006.6(b)(4)(i) requires the prior consent of the consumer to be given directly to the debt collector. For example, a debt collector cannot rely on the prior consent of the consumer given to a creditor or to a previous debt collector.

Official Interpretation

6(c) Communications with a consumer—after refusal to pay or cease communication notice.

6(c)(1) Prohibitions.

1. Notification complete upon receipt. If, pursuant to § 1006.6(c)(1), a consumer notifies a debt collector in writing or electronically using a medium of electronic communication through which a debt collector accepts electronic communications from consumers that the consumer either refuses to pay a debt or wants the debt collector to cease further communication with the consumer, notification is complete upon the debt collector’s receipt of that information. The following example illustrates the rule.

i. Assume that on August 3, a consumer places in the mail a written notification to a debt collector that the consumer either refuses to pay a debt or wants the debt collector to cease further communication with the consumer pursuant to § 1006.6(c)(1). On August 4, the debt collector sends the consumer an email message. The debt collector receives the consumer’s written notification on August 6. Because the consumer’s notification is complete upon the debt collector’s receipt of that information on August 6, the debt collector’s email message communication on August 4 does not violate § 1006.6(c)(1).

2. Interpretation of the E-SIGN Act. Comment 6(c)(1)–1 constitutes the Bureau’s interpretation of section 101 of the E-SIGN Act as applied to FDCPA section 805(c). Under this interpretation, section 101(a) of the E-SIGN Act enables a consumer to satisfy the requirement in FDCPA section 805(c) that the consumer’s notification of the debt collector be “in writing” through an electronic request. Further, because the consumer may only satisfy the writing requirement using a medium of electronic communication through which a debt collector accepts electronic communications from consumers, section 101(b) of the E-SIGN Act is not contravened.

6(c)(2) Exceptions.

1. Written early intervention notice for mortgage servicers. The Bureau has interpreted the written early intervention notice required by 12 CFR 1024.39(d)(3) to fall within the exceptions to the cease communication provision in FDCPA section 805(c)(2) and (3). See 12 CFR 1024.39(d)(3), its commentary, and the Bureau’s 2016 FDCPA Interpretive Rule (81 FR 71977 (Oct. 19, 2016)).

2. Other mortgage servicing rule provisions. Notwithstanding a consumer’s cease communication request pursuant to § 1006.6(c)(1), a mortgage servicer who is subject to the FDCPA with respect to a mortgage loan is not liable under the FDCPA for complying with certain servicing rule provisions, including requirements to provide a consumer with disclosures regarding the forced placement of hazard insurance as required by 12 CFR 1024.37, a disclosure regarding an adjustable-rate mortgage’s initial interest rate adjustment as required by 12 CFR 1026.20(d), and a periodic statement for each billing cycle as required by 12 CFR 1026.41. See CFPB Bulletin 2013-12 (Oct. 15, 2013) providing implementation guidance for certain mortgage servicing rules.

Official Interpretation

6(d) Communications with third parties.

6(d)(2) Exceptions.

1. Prior consent. See the commentary to § 1006.6(b)(4)(i) for guidance concerning a consumer giving prior consent directly to a debt collector.

6(d)(3) Reasonable procedures for email and text message communications.

Paragraph 6(d)(3)(ii).

1. Knowledge of prohibited disclosure. For purposes of § 1006.6(d)(3)(ii), a debt collector knows that sending an email to an email address or a text message to a telephone number has led to a disclosure prohibited by § 1006.6(d)(1) if any person has informed the debt collector of that fact.

6(d)(4) Procedures for email addresses.

6(d)(4)(i) Procedures based on communication between the consumer and the debt collector.

Paragraph 6(d)(4)(i)(B).

1. Prior consent—in general. Section 1006.6(d)(4)(i)(B) provides that, for purposes of § 1006.6(d)(3)(i), a debt collector may send an email to an email address if, among other things, the debt collector has received directly from the consumer prior consent to use the email address to communicate with the consumer about the debt. For purposes of § 1006.6(d)(4)(i)(B), a consumer may provide consent directly to a debt collector through any medium of communication, such as in writing, electronically, or orally.

2. Prior consent—consumer-provided email address. If a consumer provides an email address to a debt collector (including on the debt collector’s website or online portal), the debt collector may treat the consumer as having consented directly to the debt collector’s use of the email address to communicate with the consumer about the debt for purposes of § 1006.6(d)(4)(i)(B) if the debt collector discloses clearly and conspicuously that the debt collector may use the email address to communicate with the consumer about the debt.

6(d)(4)(ii) Procedures based on communication by the creditor.

Paragraph 6(d)(4)(ii)(B).

1. Communications about the account. Section 1006.6(d)(4)(ii)(B) provides that, for purposes of § 1006.6(d)(3)(i), a debt collector may send an email to an email address if, among other things, the creditor used the email address to communicate with the consumer about the account giving rise to the debt. For purposes of § 1006.6(d)(4)(ii)(B), communications about the account include, for example, required disclosures, bills, invoices, periodic statements, payment reminders, and payment confirmations. Communications about the account do not include, for example, marketing or advertising materials unrelated to the consumer’s account.

Paragraph 6(d)(4)(ii)(C).

1. Clear and conspicuous. Clear and conspicuous means readily understandable. In the case of written and electronic disclosures, the location and type size also must be readily noticeable and legible to consumers, although no minimum type size is mandated.

2. Sample language. Section 1006.6(d)(4)(ii)(C) provides that, for purposes of § 1006.6(d)(3)(i), a debt collector may send an email to an email address if, among other things, the creditor sent the consumer a written or electronic notice that clearly and conspicuously disclosed that the debt would be transferred to the debt collector; that the debt collector might use the email address to communicate with the consumer about the debt; that, if others have access to this email address, then it is possible they may see the emails; instructions for a reasonable and simple method by which the consumer could opt out of such communications; and the date by which the debt collector or creditor must receive the consumer’s request to opt out.

i. When a creditor sends the notice in writing, the creditor may use, but is not required to use, the following language to satisfy § 1006.6(d)(4)(ii)(C): “We are transferring your account to ABC debt collector, and we are providing ABC debt collector with the following email address for you: [email address]. ABC debt collector may use this email address to communicate with you about the debt. If others have access to this email address, then it is possible they may see the emails. If you would like to opt out of communications by ABC debt collector to [email address], please fill out the enclosed form and return it in the enclosed envelope so that we receive it by [date].”

ii. When a creditor sends the notice electronically, the creditor may use, but is not required to use, the following language to satisfy § 1006.6(d)(4)(ii)(C): “We are transferring your account to ABC debt collector, and we are providing ABC debt collector with the following email address for you: [email address]. ABC debt collector may use this email address to communicate with you about the debt. If others have access to this email address, then it is possible they may see the emails. If you would like to opt out of communications by ABC debt collector to [email address], please click here by [date].”

3. Combined notice. A notice provided by the creditor under § 1006.6(d)(4)(ii)(C) may be contained in a larger communication that conveys other information, as long as the notice is clear and conspicuous.

Paragraph 6(d)(4)(ii)(C)(1).

1. Identification of the debt collector. Under § 1006.6(d)(4)(ii)(C)(1), the notice must clearly and conspicuously disclose, among other things, that the debt has been or will be transferred to the debt collector. To satisfy this requirement, the notice must identify the name of the specific debt collector to which the debt has been or will be transferred.

Paragraph 6(d)(4)(ii)(C)(4).

1. Reasonable and simple method to opt out. Under § 1006.6(d)(4)(ii)(C)(4), the notice must clearly and conspicuously disclose instructions for a reasonable and simple method by which the consumer can opt out of the debt collector’s use of the email address to communicate about the debt. The following examples illustrate the rule.

i. When the creditor sends the notice in writing, reasonable and simple methods for opting out include providing a reply form and a pre-addressed envelope together with the opt-out notice. Requiring a consumer to call or write to obtain a form for opting out, rather than including the form with the opt-out notice, does not meet the requirement to provide a reasonable and simple method for opting out.

ii. When the creditor sends the notice electronically, reasonable and simple methods for opting out include providing an electronic means to opt out, such as a hyperlink, or allowing the consumer to opt out by replying to the communication with the word “stop.” Requiring a consumer who receives the opt-out notice electronically to opt out by postal mail, telephone, or visiting a website without providing a link does not meet the requirement to provide a reasonable and simple method for opting out.

Paragraph 6(d)(4)(ii)(C)(5).

1. Recipient of opt-out request. Under § 1006.6(d)(4)(ii)(C)(5), the notice must clearly and conspicuously disclose the date by which a debt collector or creditor must receive a consumer’s request to opt out, which must be at least 35 days after the date the notice is sent. The notice may instruct the consumer to respond to the debt collector or to the creditor but not to both.

Paragraph 6(d)(4)(ii)(D).

1. Effect of opt-out request after expiration of opt-out period. If a consumer requests after the expiration of the opt-out period that the debt collector not communicate using the email address identified in the opt-out notice, such as by returning the notice or opting out under § 1006.6(e), § 1006.14(h)(1) prohibits the debt collector from communicating or attempting to communicate with the consumer using that email address. If the consumer requests after the expiration of the opt-out period that the debt collector not communicate with the consumer by email, § 1006.14(h)(1) prohibits the debt collector from communicating or attempting to communicate with the consumer by email, including by using the specific email address identified in the notice. For more on prohibited communication media and certain exceptions, see § 1006.14(h) and its associated commentary. If after the expiration of the opt-out period the consumer notifies the debt collector in writing or electronically using a medium of electronic communication through which a debt collector accepts electronic communications from consumers that the consumer refuses to pay the debt or wants the debt collector to cease further communication with the consumer, § 1006.6(c)(1) prohibits the debt collector from communicating or attempting to communicate with the consumer with respect to the debt, subject to the exceptions in § 1006.6(c)(2). For more on communications with a consumer after refusal to pay or a cease communication notice, see § 1006.6(c) and its associated commentary.

2. Scope of opt-out request. In the absence of evidence that the consumer refuses to pay the debt or wants the debt collector to cease all communication with the consumer, a consumer’s request under § 1006.6(d)(4)(ii)(D) to opt out of a debt collector’s use of a particular email address to communicate with the consumer by email does not constitute a notification to cease further communication with respect to the debt under § 1006.6(c)(1).

Paragraph 6(d)(4)(ii)(E).

1. Domain name available for use by the general public. Under § 1006.6(d)(4)(ii)(E), the domain name of an email address is available for use by the general public when multiple members of the general public are permitted to use the same domain name, whether for free or through a paid subscription. Such a name does not include one that is reserved for use by specific registrants, such as a domain name branded for use by a particular commercial entity (e.g., john.doe@springsidemortgage.com) or reserved for particular types of institutions (e.g., john.doe@agency.gov, john.doe@university.edu, or john.doe@nonprofit.org).

2. Knowledge of employer-provided email address. For purposes of § 1006.6(d)(4)(ii)(E), a debt collector knows that an email address is provided by the consumer’s employer if any person has informed the debt collector that the address is employer provided. However, § 1006.6(d)(4)(ii)(E) does not require a debt collector to conduct a manual review of consumer accounts to determine whether an email address might be employer provided.

6(d)(4)(iii) Procedures based on communication by the prior debt collector.

1. Immediately prior debt collector. Section 1006.6(d)(4)(iii) provides that, for purposes of § 1006.6(d)(3)(i), a debt collector may send an email to an email address if, among other things, the immediately prior debt collector used the email address to communicate with the consumer about the debt. For purposes of § 1006.6(d)(4)(iii), the immediately prior debt collector is the debt collector immediately preceding the current debt collector. For example, if ABC debt collector returns a debt to the creditor and the creditor places the debt with XYZ debt collector, ABC debt collector is the immediately prior debt collector for purposes of § 1006.6(d)(4)(iii).

2. Examples. The following examples illustrate the rule.

i. After obtaining a consumer’s email address in accordance with the procedures in § 1006.6(d)(4)(i) or (ii), ABC debt collector communicates with the consumer about the debt using that email address and the consumer does not opt out. ABC debt collector returns the debt to the creditor, who places it with XYZ debt collector. XYZ debt collector communicates with the consumer about the debt using the email address obtained by ABC debt collector. Assuming that the requirements of § 1006.6(d)(3)(ii) are satisfied, XYZ debt collector may have a bona fide error defense to civil liability for any unintentional third-party disclosure that occurs during that communication because a prior debt collector (i.e., ABC debt collector) obtained the email address in accordance with the procedures in § 1006.6(d)(4)(i) or (ii), the immediately prior debt collector (i.e., ABC debt collector) used the email address to communicate with the consumer about the debt, and the consumer did not opt out of such communications by ABC debt collector.

ii. After obtaining a consumer’s email address in accordance with the procedures in § 1006.6(d)(4)(i) or (ii), ABC debt collector communicates with the consumer about the debt using that email address and the consumer does not opt out. ABC debt collector returns the debt to the creditor, who places it with EFG debt collector. EFG debt collector communicates with the consumer about the debt using the email address obtained by ABC debt collector, and the consumer does not opt out. EFG debt collector returns the debt to the creditor, who places it with XYZ debt collector. XYZ debt collector communicates with the consumer about the debt using the email address obtained by ABC debt collector and used by EFG debt collector. Assuming that the requirements of § 1006.6(d)(3)(ii) are satisfied, XYZ debt collector may have a bona fide error defense to civil liability for any unintentional third-party disclosure that occurs during that communication because a prior debt collector (i.e., ABC debt collector) obtained the email address in accordance with the procedures in § 1006.6(d)(4)(i) or (ii), the immediately prior debt collector (i.e., EFG debt collector) used the email address to communicate with the consumer about the debt, and the consumer did not opt out of such communications by EFG debt collector.

iii. After obtaining a consumer’s email address in accordance with the procedures in § 1006.6(d)(4)(i) or (ii), ABC debt collector communicates with the consumer about the debt using that email address and the consumer does not opt out. ABC debt collector returns the debt to the creditor, who places it with EFG debt collector, who chooses not to communicate with the consumer by email. EFG debt collector returns the debt to the creditor, who places it with XYZ debt collector. XYZ debt collector communicates with the consumer about the debt using the email address obtained by ABC debt collector. Section 1006.6(d)(4)(iii) does not provide XYZ debt collector with a bona fide error defense to civil liability for any unintentional third-party disclosure that occurs during that communication because the immediately prior debt collector (i.e., EFG debt collector) did not use the email address to communicate with the consumer about the debt.

6(d)(5) Procedures for telephone numbers for text messages.

1. Complete and accurate database. Section 1006.6(d)(5)(i) and (ii) provides that, for purposes of § 1006.6(d)(3)(i), a debt collector may send a text message to a telephone number if, among other things, the debt collector confirms, using a complete and accurate database, that the telephone number has not been reassigned from the consumer to another user. For purposes of § 1006.6(d)(5)(i) and (ii), the database established by the FCC in In re Advanced Methods to Target & Eliminate Unlawful Robocalls (33 FCC Rcd. 12024 (Dec. 12, 2018)) qualifies as a complete and accurate database, as does any commercially available database that is substantially similar in terms of completeness and accuracy to the FCC’s database.

Paragraph 6(d)(5)(i).

1. Response to telephone call by consumer. Section 1006.6(d)(5)(i) provides that, for purposes of § 1006.6(d)(3)(i), a debt collector may send a text message to a telephone number if, among other things, the consumer used the telephone number to communicate by text message with the debt collector about the debt. Section 1006.6(d)(5)(i) does not apply if the consumer used the telephone number to communicate only by telephone call with the debt collector about the debt.

Paragraph 6(d)(5)(ii).

1. Prior consent. See comment 6(d)(4)(i)(B)–1 for guidance concerning how a consumer may provide prior consent directly to a debt collector. See comment 6(d)(4)(i)(B)–2 for guidance concerning when a debt collector may treat a consumer who provides a telephone number for text messages as having consented directly to the debt collector.

Official Interpretation

6(e) Opt-out notice for electronic communications or attempts to communicate.

1. In general. Section 1006.6(e) requires a debt collector who communicates or attempts to communicate with a consumer electronically in connection with the collection of a debt using a specific email address, telephone number for text messages, or other electronic-medium address to include in such communication or attempt to communicate a clear and conspicuous statement describing a reasonable and simple method by which the consumer can opt out of further electronic communications or attempts to communicate by the debt collector to that address or telephone number. See comment 6(d)(4)(ii)(C)–1 for guidance on the meaning of clear and conspicuous. See comment 6(d)(4)(ii)(C)(4)–1 for guidance on the meaning of reasonable and simple. The following examples illustrate the rule.

i. Assume that a debt collector sends a text message to a consumer’s mobile telephone number. The text message includes the following instruction: “Reply STOP to stop texts to this telephone number.” Assuming that it is readily noticeable and legible to consumers, this instruction constitutes a clear and conspicuous statement describing a reasonable and simple method to opt out of receiving further text messages from the debt collector to that telephone number consistent with § 1006.6(e). No minimum type size is mandated.

ii. Assume that a debt collector sends the consumer an email that includes a hyperlink labeled: “Click here to opt out of further emails to this email address.” Assuming that it is readily noticeable and legible to consumers, this instruction constitutes a clear and conspicuous statement describing a reasonable and simple method to opt out of receiving further emails from the debt collector to that email address consistent with § 1006.6(e). No minimum type size is mandated.

iii. Assume that a debt collector sends the consumer an email that includes instructions in a textual format explaining that the consumer may opt out of receiving further email communications from the debt collector to that email address by replying with the word “stop” in the subject line. Assuming that it is readily noticeable and legible to consumers, this instruction constitutes a clear and conspicuous statement describing a reasonable and simple method to opt out of receiving further emails from the debt collector to that email address consistent with § 1006.6(e). No minimum type size is mandated.

Official Interpretation

10(a) Definition.

1. Location information about deceased consumers. If a consumer obligated or allegedly obligated to pay any debt is deceased, location information includes the information described in § 1006.10(a) for a person who is authorized to act on behalf of the deceased consumer’s estate, as described in § 1006.6(a)(4) and its associated commentary.

Official Interpretation

10(b) Form and content of location communications.

Paragraph 10(b)(2).

1. Executors, administrators, or personal representatives of a deceased consumer’s estate. Section 1006.10(b)(2) prohibits a debt collector who is communicating with any person other than the consumer for the purpose of acquiring location information about the consumer from stating that the consumer owes any debt. If the consumer obligated or allegedly obligated to pay the debt is deceased, and the debt collector is attempting to locate the person who is authorized to act on behalf of the deceased consumer’s estate, the debt collector does not violate § 1006.10(b)(2) by stating that the debt collector is seeking to identify and locate the person who is authorized to act on behalf of the deceased consumer’s estate. The debt collector may also state that the debt collector is seeking to identify and locate the person handling the financial affairs of the deceased consumer. For more on executors, administrators, and personal representatives, see § 1006.6(a)(4) and its associated commentary.

Official Interpretation

14(a) In general.

1. General prohibition. Section 1006.14(a), which implements FDCPA section 806 (15 U.S.C. 1692d), sets forth a general standard that prohibits a debt collector from engaging in any conduct the natural consequence of which is to harass, oppress, or abuse any person in connection with the collection of a debt. The general prohibition covers the specific conduct described in § 1006.14(b) through (h), as well as any conduct by the debt collector that is not specifically prohibited by § 1006.14(b) through (h) but the natural consequence of which is to harass, oppress, or abuse any person in connection with the collection of a debt. Such conduct can occur regardless of the communication media the debt collector uses, including in-person interactions, telephone calls, audio recordings, paper documents, mail, email, text messages, social media, or other electronic media, even if not specifically addressed by § 1006.14(b) through (h). The following example illustrates the rule.

i. Assume that, in connection with the collection of a debt, a debt collector sends a consumer numerous, unsolicited text messages per day for several consecutive days. The consumer does not respond. Assume further that the debt collector does not communicate or attempt to communicate with the consumer using any other communication medium and that, by sending the text messages, the debt collector has not violated § 1006.14(b) through (h). Even though the debt collector’s conduct does not violate any specific prohibition under § 1006.14(b) through (h), it is likely that the natural consequence of the debt collector’s text messages is to harass, oppress, or abuse the person receiving the text messages; when such natural consequence occurs, the debt collector has violated § 1006.14(a) and FDCPA section 806.

2. Cumulative effect of conduct. Whether a debt collector’s conduct violates the general standard in § 1006.14(a) may depend on the cumulative effect of the debt collector’s conduct through any communication medium the debt collector uses, including in-person interactions, telephone calls, audio recordings, paper documents, mail, email, text messages, social media, or other electronic media. Depending on the facts and circumstances, conduct that on its own would violate neither the general prohibition in § 1006.14(a), nor any specific prohibition in § 1006.14(b) through (h), nonetheless may violate § 1006.14(a) when such conduct is evaluated cumulatively with other conduct. The following example illustrates the rule as applied to a debt collector who uses multiple communication media to communicate or attempt to communicate with a person.

i. Assume that a debt collector places seven unanswered telephone calls within seven consecutive days to a consumer in connection with the collection of a debt. During this same period, the debt collector also sends multiple additional unsolicited emails about the debt to the consumer. The consumer does not respond. The frequency of the debt collector’s telephone calls during the seven-day period does not exceed the telephone call frequencies described in § 1006.14(b)(2)(i), so the debt collector is presumed to comply with § 1006.14(b)(1). Assume further that no evidence is offered to rebut the presumption of compliance, such that the debt collector complies with § 1006.14(b)(1). Also assume that, for purposes of this illustrative example only, the frequency of the debt collector’s emails alone does not violate § 1006.14(a). It nevertheless is likely that the cumulative effect of the debt collector’s telephone calls and emails is harassment; when such natural consequence occurs, the debt collector has violated § 1006.14(a) and FDCPA section 806.

Official Interpretation

14(b) Repeated or continuous telephone calls or telephone conversations.

1. Placing telephone calls repeatedly or continuously. Section 1006.14(b) prohibits a debt collector from, in connection with the collection of a debt, placing telephone calls or engaging any person in telephone conversation repeatedly or continuously with intent to annoy, abuse, or harass any person at the called number, and it describes when a debt collector is presumed to have complied with or violated that prohibition. For purposes of § 1006.14(b)(1) through (4), “placing a telephone call” includes conveying a ringless voicemail but does not include sending an electronic message (e.g., a text message or an email) that may be received on a mobile telephone.

14(b)(1) In general.

1. Effect of compliance. A debt collector who complies with § 1006.14(b)(1) and FDCPA section 806(5) (15 U.S.C. 1692d(5)) complies with § 1006.14(a) and FDCPA section 806 (15 U.S.C. 1692d) solely with respect to the frequency of its telephone calls. The debt collector nevertheless could violate § 1006.14(a) and FDCPA section 806 if the natural consequence of another aspect of the debt collector’s telephone calls, unrelated to frequency, is to harass, oppress, or abuse any person in connection with the collection of a debt. See also comment 14(a)–2 regarding the cumulative effect of the debt collector’s conduct.

2. Example. Assume that a debt collector communicates or attempts to communicate with a consumer about a particular debt only by telephone. The debt collector does not exceed either of the telephone call frequencies described in § 1006.14(b)(2)(i). Under § 1006.14(b)(2)(i), the debt collector is presumed to comply with § 1006.14(b)(1). Assume, further, that no evidence is offered to rebut that presumption of compliance. Pursuant to § 1006.14(b)(1), the debt collector complies with § 1006.14(a) and FDCPA section 806, but only with respect to the frequency of its telephone calls. Assume, however, that one of the debt collector’s telephone calls results in the debt collector leaving a voicemail that contains obscene language. Even though the debt collector does not violate § 1006.14(a) and FDCPA section 806 based solely on the frequency of the telephone calls, the debt collector’s obscene voicemail would violate § 1006.14(a) and (d) and FDCPA section 806 and 806(2) (15 U.S.C. 1692, 1692d(2)).

Official Interpretation

14(b)(2) Telephone call frequencies; presumptions of compliance and violation.

Paragraph 14(b)(2)(i).

1. Presumption of compliance; examples. Section 1006.14(b)(2)(i) provides that a debt collector is presumed to comply with § 1006.14(b)(1) and FDCPA section 806(5) (15 U.S.C. 1692d(5)) if the debt collector places a telephone call to a particular person in connection with the collection of a particular debt neither: more than seven times within seven consecutive days (§ 1006.14(b)(2)(i)(A)); nor within a period of seven consecutive days after having had a telephone conversation with the person in connection with the collection of such debt (§ 1006.14(b)(2)(i)(B)). For the presumption of compliance to apply, the debt collector’s telephone call frequencies must not exceed either prong of § 1006.14(b)(2)(i). The telephone call frequencies are subject to the exclusions in § 1006.14(b)(3). In addition, for purposes of § 1006.14(b)(2)(i)(B), the date of the telephone conversation is the first day of the seven-consecutive-day period. The following examples illustrate the rule.

i. On Wednesday, April 1, a debt collector first attempts to communicate with a consumer in connection with the collection of a credit card debt by placing a telephone call and leaving a limited-content message. Between Thursday, April 2, and Tuesday, April 7, the debt collector places six more telephone calls to the consumer about the debt, all of which go unanswered. As of Tuesday, April 7, the debt collector has placed seven telephone calls to the consumer in connection with the collection of the credit card debt within the period of seven consecutive days that started on Wednesday, April 1. Assume the debt collector does not place any additional telephone calls about the debt until Wednesday, April 8. Under § 1006.14(b)(2)(i), the debt collector is presumed to comply with § 1006.14(b)(1) and FDCPA section 806(5).

ii. On Thursday, August 13, a consumer places a telephone call to, and initiates a telephone conversation with, a debt collector regarding a particular debt. Assume that the debt collector does not place a telephone call to the consumer in connection with the collection of that debt again prior to Thursday, August 20. The debt collector is presumed to comply with § 1006.14(b)(1) and FDCPA section 806(5).

iii. On Tuesday, October 6, a debt collector first attempts to communicate with a particular third party for the purpose of acquiring location information about a consumer by placing a telephone call to that third party. The call is unanswered. The debt collector places up to six more unanswered telephone calls to that third party for the purpose of acquiring location information about the consumer through Monday, October 12. The debt collector is presumed to comply with § 1006.14(b)(1) and FDCPA section 806(5). See § 1006.10(c) for further guidance concerning when a debt collector is prohibited from communicating with a person other than the consumer for the purpose of acquiring location information.

2. Factors to rebut the presumption of compliance. To rebut the presumption of compliance, it must be proven that a debt collector who did not place a telephone call in excess of either of the telephone call frequencies described in § 1006.14(b)(2)(i) nevertheless placed a telephone call or engaged a person in telephone conversation repeatedly or continuously with intent to annoy, abuse, or harass any person at the called number. For purposes of determining whether the presumption of compliance has been rebutted, it is assumed that debt collectors intend the natural consequence of their actions. Comments 14(b)(2)(i)–2.i through .iv provide a non-exhaustive list of factors that may rebut the presumption of compliance. The factors may be considered either individually or in combination with one another (or other non-specified factors). The factors may be viewed in light of any other relevant facts and circumstances and therefore may apply to varying degrees. Factors that may rebut the presumption of compliance include:

i. The frequency and pattern of telephone calls the debt collector places to a person, including the intervals between them. The considerations relevant to this factor include whether the debt collector placed telephone calls to a person in rapid succession (e.g., two unanswered telephone calls to the same telephone number within five minutes) or in a highly concentrated manner (e.g., seven telephone calls to the same telephone number within one day). For example, assume the same facts as in comment 14(b)(2)(i)–1.i, except assume that, after the debt collector placed the first telephone call to the consumer about the credit card debt on Wednesday, April 1, the debt collector placed six additional telephone calls to the consumer about that debt on Friday, April 3. Under § 1006.14(b)(2)(i), the debt collector is presumed to comply with § 1006.14(b)(1) and FDCPA section 806(5), but the high concentration of telephone calls on Friday, April 3, is a factor that may rebut the presumption of compliance.

ii. The frequency and pattern of any voicemails that the debt collector leaves for a person, including the intervals between them. The considerations relevant to this factor include whether the debt collector left voicemails for a person in rapid succession (e.g., two voicemails within five minutes left at the same telephone number) or in a highly concentrated manner (e.g., seven voicemails left at the same telephone number within one day).

iii. The content of a person’s prior communications with the debt collector. Among the considerations relevant to this factor are whether the person previously informed the debt collector, for example, that the person did not wish to be contacted again about the particular debt, that the person was refusing to pay the particular debt, or that the person did not owe the particular debt. This factor also includes a consumer’s cease communication notification described in § 1006.6(c) and a consumer’s request under § 1006.14(h) that the debt collector not use telephone calls to communicate or attempt to communicate with the consumer. The amount of time elapsed since any such prior communications also may be relevant to this factor.

iv. The debt collector’s conduct in prior communications or attempts to communicate with the person. Among the considerations relevant to this factor are whether, during a prior communication or attempt to communicate with a person, the debt collector, for example, used obscene, profane, or otherwise abusive language (see § 1006.14(d)), used or threatened to use violence or other criminal means to harm the person (see § 1006.14(c)), or called at an inconvenient time or place (see § 1006.6(b)(1)). The amount of time elapsed since any such prior communications or attempts to communicate also may be relevant to this factor.

3. Misdirected telephone calls. Section 1006.14(b)(2)(i) provides that a debt collector is presumed to comply with § 1006.14(b)(1) and FDCPA section 806(5) (15 U.S.C. 1692d(5)) if the debt collector’s telephone call frequencies do not exceed the telephone call frequencies described in § 1006.14(b)(2)(i). If, within a period of seven consecutive days, a debt collector attempts to communicate with a particular person by placing telephone calls to a particular telephone number, and the debt collector then learns that the telephone number is not that person’s number, the telephone calls that the debt collector made to that number are not considered to have been telephone calls placed to that person during that seven-consecutive-day period for purposes of § 1006.14(b)(2)(i). For example:

i. Assume that a debt collector first attempts to communicate with a consumer on Monday, and again on Wednesday, by placing one unanswered telephone call to a particular telephone number on each of those days. On Thursday, the debt collector learns that the telephone number belongs to someone else and that the consumer does not answer telephone calls to that number. For purposes of § 1006.14(b)(2)(i), the debt collector has not yet placed any telephone calls to that consumer during that seven-consecutive-day period.

Paragraph 14(b)(2)(ii).

1. Presumption of a violation; examples. Section 1006.14(b)(2)(ii) provides that a debt collector is presumed to violate § 1006.14(b)(1) and FDCPA section 806(5) (15 U.S.C. 1692d(5)) if the debt collector places a telephone call to a particular person in connection with the collection of a particular debt in excess of either of the telephone call frequencies described in § 1006.14(b)(2)(i). The telephone call frequencies are subject to the exclusions in § 1006.14(b)(3). The following examples illustrate the rule.

i. On Wednesday, April 1, a debt collector first attempts to communicate with a consumer in connection with the collection of a mortgage debt by placing a telephone call and leaving a limited-content message. On each of the next three business days (i.e., on Thursday, April 2, Friday, April 3, and Monday, April 6), the debt collector places two additional telephone calls to the consumer about the debt, all of which go unanswered. On Tuesday, April 7, the debt collector places an additional telephone call to the consumer about the debt. The debt collector has placed a total of eight telephone calls to the consumer about the debt during the seven-day period starting Wednesday, April 1. None of the calls was subject to the exclusions in § 1006.14(b)(3). The debt collector is presumed to violate § 1006.14(b)(1) and FDCPA section 806(5).

ii. On Tuesday, August 11, a debt collector first attempts to communicate with a consumer in connection with the collection of a credit card debt by placing a telephone call to the consumer that the consumer does not answer. On Friday, August 14, the debt collector again places a telephone call to the consumer and has a telephone conversation with the consumer in connection with the collection of the debt. Subject to the exclusions in § 1006.14(b)(3), the debt collector is presumed to violate § 1006.14(b)(1) and FDCPA section 806(5) if the debt collector places a telephone call to the consumer in connection with the collection of that debt again prior to Friday, August 21.

2. Factors to rebut the presumption of a violation. To rebut the presumption of a violation, it must be proven that a debt collector who placed telephone calls in excess of either of the frequencies described in § 1006.14(b)(2)(i) nevertheless did not place a telephone call or engage any person in telephone conversation repeatedly or continuously with intent to annoy, abuse, or harass any person at the called number. For purposes of determining whether the presumption of a violation has been rebutted, it is assumed that debt collectors intend the natural consequence of their actions. Comments 14(b)(2)(ii)–2.i through .iv provide a non-exhaustive list of factors that may rebut the presumption of a violation. The factors may be considered either individually or in combination with one another (or other non-specified factors). The factors may be viewed in light of any other relevant facts and circumstances and therefore may apply to varying degrees. Factors that may rebut the presumption of a violation include:

i. Whether a debt collector placed a telephone call to comply with, or as required by, applicable law. For example, assume the same facts as in comment 14(b)(2)(ii)–1.i, except assume that the debt collector placed the final telephone call of the seven-consecutive-day period to inform the consumer of available loss mitigation options in compliance with the Bureau’s mortgage servicing rules under Regulation X, 12 CFR 1024.39(a). The debt collector’s compliance with applicable law is a factor that may rebut the presumption of a violation.

ii. Whether a debt collector placed a telephone call that was directly related to active litigation involving the collection of a particular debt. For example, assume the same facts as in comment 14(b)(2)(ii)–1.ii, except assume that, after the debt collector and the consumer had a telephone conversation about the credit card debt on Friday, August 14, the debt collector placed another telephone call to the consumer before Friday, August 21, to complete a court-ordered communication with the consumer about the debt, or as part of negotiations to settle active debt collection litigation regarding the debt. The direct relationship between the additional telephone call and the active debt collection litigation is a factor that may rebut the presumption of a violation.

iii. Whether a debt collector placed a telephone call in response to a consumer’s request for additional information when the exclusion in § 1006.14(b)(3)(i) for telephone calls made with the consumer’s prior consent given directly to the debt collector did not apply. For example, assume the same facts as in comment 14(b)(2)(ii)–1.ii, except assume that, during the telephone conversation about the credit card debt on Friday, August 14, the consumer told the debt collector that the consumer would like more information about the amount of the debt but that the consumer could not talk at that moment. The consumer ended the telephone call before the debt collector could seek prior consent under § 1006.14(b)(3)(i) to call back with the requested information. The debt collector placed another telephone call to the consumer prior to Friday, August 21, to provide the requested information. The fact that the debt collector placed the additional telephone call in response to the consumer’s request is a factor that may rebut the presumption of a violation.

iv. Whether a debt collector placed a telephone call to convey information to the consumer that, as shown through evidence, would provide the consumer with an opportunity to avoid a demonstrably negative effect relating to the collection of the particular debt, where the negative effect was not in the debt collector’s control, and where time was of the essence. For example, in each of the following three scenarios, assume the same facts as in comment 14(b)(2)(ii)–1.ii, and also assume that:

A. During the telephone conversation about the credit card debt on Friday, August 14, the debt collector and the consumer engaged in a lengthy conversation regarding settlement terms, and, toward the end of the conversation, the telephone call dropped. The debt collector immediately placed an additional telephone call to the consumer to complete the conversation. The fact that the debt collector placed the telephone call to permit the debt collector and the consumer to complete the conversation about settlement terms, which provided the consumer an opportunity to avoid a demonstrably negative effect that was not in the debt collector’s control (i.e., having to repeat a substantive conversation with a potentially different representative of the debt collector) and where time was of the essence (i.e., to prevent the delay of settlement negotiations by seven days) is a factor that may rebut the presumption of a violation.

B. The consumer previously entered into a payment plan with the debt collector regarding the credit card debt. The conditions for the payment plan were set by the creditor, and among those conditions is that only the creditor, in its sole discretion, may approve waivers of late fees. On Monday, August 17, the debt collector learned that the consumer’s payment failed to process, and the applicable grace period was set to expire on Tuesday, August 18. The debt collector placed a telephone call to the consumer on Monday to remind the consumer that a late fee would be applied by the creditor for non-payment unless the consumer made the payment by the next day. The fact that the debt collector placed the telephone call to alert the consumer to the pending penalty, giving the consumer an opportunity to avoid a demonstrably negative effect that was not in the debt collector’s control and where time was of the essence, is a factor that may rebut the presumption of a violation.

C. On Monday, August 17, the debt collector placed a telephone call to the consumer to offer the consumer a “one-time only” discount on the payment of the credit card debt. The debt collector stated that the offer would expire the next day when, in fact, the debt collector could have offered the same or a similar discount through the end of August. Because the negative effect on the consumer was in the debt collector’s control, the discount offer is not a factor that may rebut the presumption of a violation.

Official Interpretation

14(b)(3) Certain telephone calls excluded from telephone call frequencies.

Paragraph 14(b)(3)(i).

1. Prior consent. Section 1006.14(b)(3)(i) excludes from the telephone call frequencies described in § 1006.14(b)(2) certain telephone calls placed to a person who gives prior consent. See § 1006.6(b)(4)(i) and its associated commentary for guidance about giving prior consent directly to a debt collector. Nothing in § 1006.14(b)(3)(i) regarding prior consent for telephone call frequencies permits a debt collector to communicate, or attempt to communicate, with a consumer as prohibited by §§ 1006.6(b) and 1006.14(h).

2. Duration of prior consent. For purposes of § 1006.14(b)(3)(i), if a person gives prior consent for additional telephone calls about a particular debt directly to a debt collector, any telephone calls that the debt collector thereafter places to the person about that particular debt do not count toward the telephone call frequencies described in § 1006.14(b)(2) for a period of up to seven consecutive days. A person’s prior consent may expire before the conclusion of the seven-consecutive-day period. A person’s prior consent expires when any of the following occurs:

(1) the person consented to the additional telephone calls for a shorter time period and such time period has ended; (2) the person revokes such prior consent; or (3) the debt collector has a telephone conversation with the person regarding the particular debt.

3. Examples. The following examples illustrate how § 1006.14(b)(3)(i) applies:

i. On Friday, April 3, a debt collector places a telephone call to a consumer. During the ensuing telephone conversation in connection with the collection of a debt, the consumer tells the debt collector to “call back on Monday.” Absent an exception, under § 1006.14(b)(2)(ii), the debt collector would be presumed to violate § 1006.14(b)(1) and FDCPA section 806(5) (15 U.S.C. 1692d(5)) if the debt collector called the consumer on Monday, April 6, because the additional telephone call would exceed the frequency described in § 1006.14(b)(2)(i)(B). Under § 1006.14(b)(3)(i), however, in the scenario described (and absent any other facts), the debt collector could, pursuant to the consumer’s prior consent, place telephone calls to the consumer on Monday, April 6, and not lose a presumption of compliance with § 1006.14(b)(1) and FDCPA section 806(5).

ii. Assume the same facts as in the preceding example, except that the consumer does not specify a particular day the debt collector may call back. Assume further that, on Monday, April 6, the debt collector calls the consumer back and has a telephone conversation with the consumer. The exception in § 1006.14(b)(3)(i) does not apply to subsequent telephone calls placed by the debt collector to the consumer, absent additional prior consent from the consumer. For example, if the debt collector, without additional prior consent, placed a telephone call to the consumer on Wednesday, April 8, that telephone call would count toward the telephone call frequencies described in § 1006.14(b)(2), and, pursuant to § 1006.14(b)(2)(ii), the debt collector would be presumed to violate § 1006.14(b)(1) and FDCPA section 806(5).

iii. Between Monday, June 1, and Wednesday, June 3, a debt collector places three unanswered telephone calls to a consumer in connection with the collection of a debt. Also on Wednesday, June 3, the debt collector sends the consumer an email message in connection with the collection of the debt. The consumer responds by email on Thursday, June 4, requesting additional information about available repayment options related to the debt and writes, “You can call me at 123-456-7891 to discuss the repayment options.” The debt collector receives the consumer’s prior consent by email on Thursday, June 4, and thereafter places eight unanswered telephone calls to the consumer between Monday, June 8, and Wednesday, June 10. Because the consumer provided prior consent directly to the debt collector, the exclusion in § 1006.14(b)(3)(i) applies to the eight telephone calls placed by the debt collector during the seven-consecutive-day period that began with receipt of the consumer’s consent on Thursday, June 4. Those telephone calls therefore do not count toward the telephone call frequencies described in § 1006.14(b)(2)(i). However, any telephone calls placed by the debt collector after the end of the seven-day period (i.e., on or after Thursday, June 11) would count toward the telephone call frequencies described in § 1006.14(b)(2)(i), unless the consumer again gives prior consent directly to the debt collector.

Paragraph 14(b)(3)(ii).

1. Unconnected telephone calls. Section 1006.14(b)(3)(ii) provides that telephone calls placed to a person do not count toward the telephone call frequencies described in § 1006.14(b)(2)(i) if they do not connect to the dialed number. A debt collector’s telephone call does not connect to the dialed number if, for example, the debt collector receives a busy signal or an indication that the dialed number is not in service. Conversely, a telephone call placed to a person counts toward the telephone call frequencies described in § 1006.14(b)(2)(i) if it connects to the dialed number, unless an exclusion in § 1006.14(b)(3) applies. A debt collector’s telephone call connects to the dialed number if, for example, the telephone call is answered, even if it subsequently drops; if the telephone call causes a telephone to ring at the dialed number but no one answers it; or if the telephone call is connected to a voicemail or other recorded message, even if it does not cause a telephone to ring and even if the debt collector is unable to leave a voicemail.

Official Interpretation

14(h) Prohibited communication media.

14(h)(1) In general.

1. Communication media designations. Section 1006.14(h)(1) prohibits a debt collector from communicating or attempting to communicate with a person in connection with the collection of any debt through a medium of communication if the person has requested that the debt collector not use that medium to communicate with the person. The debt collector may ask follow-up questions regarding preferred communication media to clarify statements by the person. For examples of communication media, see comment 2(d)–1.

2. Specific address or telephone number. Within a medium of communication, a person may request that a debt collector not use a specific address or telephone number. For example, if a person has two mobile telephone numbers, the person may request that the debt collector not use one or both mobile telephone numbers.

3. Examples. The following examples illustrate the prohibition in § 1006.14(h)(1).

i. Assume that a person tells a debt collector to “stop calling” the person. Based on these facts, the person has requested that the debt collector not use telephone calls to communicate with the person and, thereafter, § 1006.14(h)(1) prohibits the debt collector from communicating or attempting to communicate with the person through telephone calls.

ii. Assume that, in response to receipt of either the opt-out procedures described in § 1006.6(d)(4)(ii) or the opt-out notice in § 1006.6(e), a consumer requests to opt out of receiving electronic communications from a debt collector at a particular email address or telephone number. Based on these facts, the consumer has requested that the debt collector not use that email address or telephone number to electronically communicate with the consumer for any debt and, thereafter, § 1006.14(h)(1) prohibits the debt collector from electronically communicating or attempting to communicate with the consumer through that email address or telephone number.

14(h)(2) Exceptions.

1. Legally required communication media. Under § 1006.14(h)(2)(iii), if otherwise required by applicable law, a debt collector may communicate or attempt to communicate with a person in connection with the collection of any debt through a medium of communication that the person has requested the debt collector not use to communicate with the person. For example, assume that a debt collector who is also a mortgage servicer subject to the periodic statement requirement for residential mortgage loans under Regulation Z, 12 CFR 1026.41, is engaging in debt collection communications with a person about the person’s residential mortgage loan. The person tells the debt collector to stop mailing letters to the person, and the person has not consented to receive statements electronically in accordance with 12 CFR 1026.41(c). Although the person has requested that the debt collector not use mail to communicate with the person, § 1006.14(h)(2)(iii) permits the debt collector to mail the person periodic statements, because the periodic statements are required by applicable law.

Official Interpretation

18(d) False representations or deceptive means.

1. Social media. Under § 1006.18(d), a debt collector may not use any false representation or deceptive means to collect any debt or to obtain information concerning a consumer. In the social media context, the following examples illustrate the rule:

i. Assume that a debt collector sends a private message, in connection with the collection of a debt, requesting to be added as one of the consumer’s contacts on a social media platform marketed for social or professional networking purposes. A debt collector makes a false representation or implication if the debt collector does not disclose his or her identity as a debt collector in the request.

ii. Assume that a debt collector communicates privately with a friend or coworker of a consumer on a social media platform, for the purpose of acquiring location information about the consumer. Pursuant to § 1006.10(b)(1), the debt collector must identify himself or herself individually by name when communicating for the purpose of acquiring location information. To avoid violating § 1006.18(d), the debt collector must communicate using a profile that accurately identifies the debt collector’s individual name. (But see § 1006.18(f) and its associated commentary regarding use of assumed names.) The debt collector also must comply with the other applicable requirements for obtaining location information in § 1006.10 (e.g., with respect to stating that the debt collector is confirming or correcting location information concerning the consumer and, only if expressly requested, identifying the name of the debt collector’s employer), for communicating with third parties in § 1006.6(d)(1), and for communicating through social media in § 1006.22(f)(4).

Official Interpretation

18(e) Disclosures required.

1. Communication. A limited-content message, as defined in § 1006.2(j), is not a communication, as that term is defined in § 1006.2(d). Thus, a debt collector who leaves only a limited-content message for a consumer need not make the disclosures required by § 1006.18(e)(1) and (2). However, if a debt collector leaves a voicemail message for a consumer that includes content in addition to the content described in § 1006.2(j)(1) and (2) and that directly or indirectly conveys any information regarding a debt, the voicemail message is a communication, and the debt collector is required to make the § 1006.18(e) disclosures. See the commentary to § 1006.2(d) and (j) for additional clarification regarding the definitions of communication and limited-content message.

18(e)(1) Initial communications.

1. Example. A debt collector must make the disclosure required by § 1006.18(e)(1) in the debt collector’s initial communication with a consumer, regardless of the medium of communication and regardless of whether the debt collector or the consumer initiated the communication. For example, assume that a debt collector who has not previously communicated with a consumer attempts to communicate with the consumer by leaving a limited-content message, as defined in § 1006.2(j). After listening to the debt collector’s limited-content message, the consumer initiates a telephone call to, and communicates with, the debt collector. Pursuant to § 1006.18(e)(1), because the consumer-initiated call is the initial communication between the debt collector and the consumer, the debt collector must disclose to the consumer during that telephone call that the debt collector is attempting to collect a debt and that any information obtained will be used for that purpose.

18(e)(4) Translated disclosures.

1. Example. Section 1006.18(e)(4) provides that a debt collector must make the disclosures required by § 1006.18(e)(1) and (2) in the same language or languages used for the rest of the communication in which the disclosures are conveyed. The following example illustrates the rule:

i. ABC debt collector is collecting a debt. ABC debt collector’s initial communication with the consumer takes place in Spanish. Section 1006.18(e)(4) requires ABC debt collector to provide in Spanish the disclosure required by § 1006.18(e)(1). Thereafter, ABC debt collector has a communication with the consumer that takes place partly in English and partly in Spanish. During this communication, the debt collector must provide the disclosure required by § 1006.18(e)(2) in both English and Spanish.

Official Interpretation

18(f) Assumed names.

1. Readily identifiable by the employer. Section 1006.18(f) provides, in part, that § 1006.18 does not prohibit a debt collector’s employee from using an assumed name when communicating or attempting to communicate with a person, provided that the debt collector can readily identify any employee using an assumed name. A debt collector may use any method of managing assumed names that enables the debt collector to determine the true identity of any employee using an assumed name. For example, a debt collector may require an employee to use the same assumed name when communicating or attempting to communicate with any person and may prohibit any other employee from using the same assumed name.

Official Interpretation

22(f) Restrictions on use of certain media.

1. Language or symbol. Section 1006.22(f)(2) provides, in relevant part, that a debt collector must not use any language or symbol, other than the debt collector’s address, on any envelope when communicating with a consumer by mail. For purposes of § 1006.22(f)(2), the phrase “language or symbol” does not include language and symbols that facilitate communications by mail, such as: the debtor’s name and address; postage; language such as “forwarding and address correction requested”; and the United States Postal Service’s Intelligent Mail barcode.

Paragraph 22(f)(3).

1. Email addresses described in § 1006.6(d)(4). Section 1006.22(f)(3) generally prohibits a debt collector from communicating or attempting to communicate with a consumer by sending an email to an email address that the debt collector knows is provided to the consumer by the consumer’s employer. The prohibition does not apply if the debt collector sends the email to an email address described in § 1006.6(d)(4)(i) or (iii), which specifically contemplate debt collectors sending emails to any email address—including an email address that a debt collector knows is employer provided—if the consumer has used the email address to communicate with the debt collector about a debt (§ 1006.6(d)(4)(i)(A)), has provided prior consent directly to the debt collector to use the email address (§ 1006.6(d)(4)(i)(B)), or has obtained the email address from a prior debt collector who satisfied either § 1006.6(d)(4)(i) or (ii). A debt collector who sends an email to an email address described in § 1006.6(d)(4)(ii) complies with the prohibition in § 1006.22(f)(3) because the procedures in § 1006.6(d)(4)(ii) do not permit debt collectors to send emails to email addresses that the debt collector knows are employer provided.

Paragraph 22(f)(4).

1. Social media. Section 1006.22(f)(4) prohibits a debt collector from communicating or attempting to communicate with a person in connection with the collection of a debt through a social media platform if the communication or attempt to communicate is viewable by the general public or the person’s social media contacts. For example, § 1006.22(f)(4) prohibits a debt collector from posting, in connection with the collection of a debt, any message for a person on a social media webpage if that webpage is viewable by the general public or the person’s social media contacts. Section 1006.22(f)(4) does not prohibit a debt collector from sending a message to a person if the message is not viewable by the general public or the person’s social media contacts. Section 1006.6(b) or § 1006.14(h) nonetheless may prohibit the debt collector from sending such a message, and a debt collector who communicates by sending such a message about the debt to the wrong person violates § 1006.6(d)(1). See also comment 18(d)–1 with respect to communications and attempts to communicate with consumers and third parties on social media platforms.

Official Interpretation

30(a) Required actions prior to furnishing information.

30(a)(1) In general.

1. About the debt. Section 1006.30(a)(1) provides, in relevant part, that a debt collector must not furnish to a consumer reporting agency, as defined in section 603(f) of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (15 U.S.C. 1681a(f)), information about a debt before taking one of the actions described in §1006.30(a)(1)(i) or (ii). Each of the actions includes conveying information “about the debt” to the consumer. The validation information required by §1006.34(c), including such information if provided in a validation notice, is information “about the debt.”

2. Reasonable period of time. Section 1006.30(a)(1)(ii) provides, in relevant part, that a debt collector who places a letter about a debt in the mail, or who sends an electronic message about a debt to the consumer, must wait a reasonable period of time to receive a notice of undeliverability before furnishing information about the debt to a consumer reporting agency. The reasonable period of time begins on the date that the debt collector places the letter in the mail or sends the electronic message. A period of 14 consecutive days after the date that the debt collector places a letter in the mail or sends an electronic message is a reasonable period of time.

3. Notices of undeliverability. Section 1006.30(a)(1)(ii) provides, in relevant part, that, if a debt collector who places a letter about a debt in the mail, or who sends an electronic message about a debt to the consumer, receives a notice of undeliverability during the reasonable period of time, the debt collector must not furnish information about the debt to a consumer reporting agency until the debt collector otherwise satisfies paragraph (a)(1) of this section. A debt collector who does not receive a notice of undeliverability during the reasonable period and who thereafter furnishes information about the debt to a consumer reporting agency does not violate paragraph (a)(1) of this section even if the debt collector subsequently receives a notice of undeliverability. The following examples illustrate the rule:

i. Assume that, on May 1, a debt collector mails the consumer a validation notice as described in §1006.34(a)(1)(i)(A). On May 10, the debt collector receives a notice of undeliverability and, without taking any additional action described in §1006.30(a)(1), subsequently furnishes information regarding the debt to a consumer reporting agency. The debt collector has violated §1006.30(a)(1).

ii. Assume that, on May 1, a debt collector mails the consumer a validation notice as described in §1006.34(a)(1)(i)(A). On May 10, the debt collector receives a notice of undeliverability. On May 11, the debt collector mails the consumer another validation notice as described in §1006.34(a)(1)(i)(A). From May 11 to May 24, the debt collector permits receipt of, monitors for, and does not receive, a notice of undeliverability and thereafter furnishes information regarding the debt to a consumer reporting agency. The debt collector has not violated §1006.30(a)(1).

iii. Assume that, on May 1, a debt collector mails the consumer a validation notice as described in §1006.34(a)(1)(i)(A). From May 1 to May 14, the debt collector permits receipt of, monitors for, and does not receive, a notice of undeliverability and thereafter furnishes information regarding the debt to a consumer reporting agency. After furnishing the information, the debt collector receives a notice of undeliverability. The debt collector has not violated §1006.30(a)(1) and, without taking any further action, may furnish additional information about the debt to a consumer reporting agency.

Official Interpretation

30(b)(1) In general.

1. Transfer for consideration. Section 1006.30(b)(1) prohibits, among other things, a debt collector from transferring for consideration a debt that has been paid or settled or discharged in bankruptcy. A debt collector transfers a debt for consideration when the debt collector receives or expects to receive compensation for the transfer of the debt. A debt collector does not transfer a debt for consideration when the debt collector sends information about the debt, as opposed to the debt itself, to another party. For example, a debt collector does not transfer a debt for consideration when the debt collector sends a file with data about the debt to another person for analytics, “scrubbing,” or archiving. A debt collector also does not transfer a debt for consideration when the debt collector reports to a credit reporting agency information that a debt has been paid or settled or discharged in bankruptcy.

2. Debt that resulted from identity theft. Section 615(f)(1) of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (15 U.S.C. 1681m(f)(1)) states that no person shall sell, transfer for consideration, or place for collection a debt if such person has been notified under section 605B of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (15 U.S.C. 1681c-2) that the debt has resulted from identity theft. Nothing in § 1006.30(b)(1) alters a debt collector’s obligation to comply with the prohibition set forth in section 615(f)(1) of the Fair Credit Reporting Act.

30(b)(2) Exceptions.

30(b)(2)(i) In general.

Paragraph 30(b)(2)(i)(A).

1. In general. Under § 1006.30(b)(2)(i)(A), a debt collector who is collecting a debt described in § 1006.30(b)(1) may transfer the debt to the debt’s owner. However, unless another exception under § 1006.30(b)(2) applies, the debt collector may not transfer the debt or the right to collect the debt to another entity on behalf of the debt owner.

Official Interpretation

34(a) Validation information required.

34(a)(1) In general.

1. Deceased consumers. Section 1006.34(a)(1) generally requires a debt collector to provide the validation information required by §1006.34(c) either by sending the consumer a validation notice in the manner required by §1006.42, or by providing the information orally in the debt collector's initial communication. If the debt collector knows or should know that the consumer is deceased, and if the debt collector has not previously provided the validation information to the deceased consumer, a person who is authorized to act on behalf of the deceased consumer's estate operates as the consumer for purposes of §1006.34(a)(1). In such circumstances, to comply with §1006.34(a)(1), a debt collector must provide the validation information to an individual that the debt collector identifies by name who is authorized to act on behalf of the deceased consumer's estate.

Official Interpretation

34(b) Definitions.

34(b)(2) Initial communication.

1. Bankruptcy proofs of claim. Section 1006.34(b)(2) defines initial communication and states that the term does not include a communication in the form of a formal pleading in a civil action. A proof of claim that a debt collector files in a bankruptcy proceeding in accordance with the requirements of the United States Bankruptcy Code (Title 11 of the U.S. Code) is a communication in the form of a formal pleading in a civil action and therefore is not an initial communication for purposes of §1006.34.

34(b)(3) Itemization date.

1. In general. Section 1006.34(b)(3) defines itemization date for purposes of §1006.34. Section 1006.34(b)(3) states that the itemization date is any one of five reference dates for which a debt collector can ascertain the amount of the debt. The reference dates are the last statement date, the charge-off date, the last payment date, the transaction date, and the judgment date. A debt collector may select any of these dates as the itemization date to comply with §1006.34. Once a debt collector uses a reference date for a debt in a communication with a consumer, the debt collector must use that reference date for that debt consistently when providing the information required by §1006.34(c) to that consumer. For example, if a debt collector uses the last statement date to determine and disclose the account number associated with the debt pursuant to §1006.34(c)(2)(iv), the debt collector may not use the charge-off date to determine and disclose the amount of the debt pursuant to §1006.34(c)(2)(vii).

2. Subsequent debt collectors. When selecting an itemization date pursuant to §1006.34(b)(3), a debt collector may use a different reference date than a prior debt collector who attempted to collect the debt.

Paragraph 34(b)(3)(i).

1. Last statement date. Under §1006.34(b)(3)(i), the last statement date is the date of the last periodic statement or written account statement or invoice provided to the consumer by a creditor. For purposes of §1006.34(b)(3)(i), the last statement may be provided by a creditor or a third party acting on the creditor's behalf, including a creditor's service provider. However, a statement or invoice provided by a debt collector is not a last statement for purposes of §1006.34(b)(3)(i), unless the debt collector is also a creditor.

Paragraph 34(b)(3)(iii).

1. Last payment date. Under §1006.34(b)(3)(iii), the last payment date is the date the last payment was applied to the debt. A third-party payment applied to the debt, such as a payment from an auto repossession agent or an insurance company, can be a last payment for purposes of §1006.34(b)(3)(iii).

Paragraph 34(b)(3)(iv).

1. Transaction date. Section 1006.34(b)(3)(iv) provides that the itemization date may be the date of the transaction that gave rise to the debt. The transaction date is the date that the good or service that gave rise to the debt was provided or made available to the consumer. For example, the transaction date for a debt arising from a medical procedure may be the date the medical procedure was performed, and the transaction date for a consumer's gym membership may be the date the membership contract was executed. In some cases, a debt may have more than one transaction date. This could occur, for example, if a contract for a service is executed on one date and the service is performed on another date. If a debt has more than one transaction date, a debt collector may use any such date as the transaction date for purposes of §1006.34(b)(3)(iv), but the debt collector must use whichever transaction date is selected consistently, as described in comment 34(b)(3)-1.

34(b)(5) Validation period.

1. Assumed receipt of validation information. Section 1006.34(b)(5) defines the validation period as the period starting on the date that a debt collector provides the validation information required by §1006.34(c) and ending 30 days after the consumer receives or is assumed to receive it. Section 1006.34(c)(3)(i) through (iii) requires statements that specify the end date of the validation period. If a debt collector provides the validation information in writing or electronically, then, at the time that the debt collector calculates the validation period end date, the debt collector will know only the date on which the consumer is assumed to receive the validation information. In such cases, the debt collector may use that date to calculate the validation period end date even if the debt collector later learns that the consumer received the validation information on a different date.

2. Updated validation period. If a debt collector sends a subsequent validation notice to a consumer because the consumer did not receive the original validation notice and the consumer has not otherwise received the validation information required by §1006.34(c), the debt collector must calculate the end date of the validation period specified in the §1006.34(c)(3) disclosures based on the date the consumer receives or is assumed to receive the subsequent validation notice. For example, assume a debt collector sends a consumer a validation notice on January 1, and that notice is returned as undeliverable. After obtaining accurate location information, the debt collector sends the consumer a subsequent validation notice on January 15. Pursuant to §1006.34(b)(5), the end date of the validation period specified in the §1006.34(c)(3) disclosures is based on the date the consumer receives or is assumed to receive the validation notice sent on January 15.

Official Interpretation

34(c) Validation information.

34(c)(1) Debt collector communication disclosure.

1. Statement required by §1006.18(e). Section 1006.34(c)(1) provides that validation information includes the statement required by §1006.18(e). Section 1006.18(e)(1) requires a debt collector to disclose in its initial communication that the debt collector is attempting to collect a debt and that any information obtained will be used for that purpose. Section 1006.18(e)(2) requires a debt collector to disclose in each subsequent communication that the communication is from a debt collector. A debt collector who provides a validation notice as described in §1006.34(a)(1)(i)(A) complies with §1006.34(c)(1) by providing on the validation notice the disclosure required by §1006.18(e)(1). A debt collector who provides a validation notice as described in §1006.34(a)(1)(i)(B) complies with §1006.34(c)(1) by providing either the disclosure required by §1006.18(e)(1) or the disclosure required by §1006.18(e)(2). The following example illustrates the rule:

i. ABC debt collector has an initial communication with the consumer by telephone. Within five days of that initial communication, ABC debt collector sends the consumer a validation notice using Model Form B-1 in appendix B to this part. ABC debt collector has complied with §1006.34(c)(1) even though Model Form B-1 includes the disclosure described in §1006.18(e)(1) rather than the disclosure described in §1006.18(e)(2).

34(c)(2) Information about the debt.

Paragraph 34(c)(2)(i).

1. Debt collector's name. Section 1006.34(c)(2)(i) provides, in part, that validation information includes the debt collector's name. A debt collector may disclose its trade or doing-business-as name, instead of its legal name.

2. Debt collector's mailing address. Section 1006.34(c)(2)(i) provides, in part, that validation information includes the mailing address at which the debt collector accepts disputes and requests for original-creditor information. A debt collector may disclose a vendor's mailing address, if that is an address at which the debt collector accepts disputes and requests for original-creditor information.

Paragraph 34(c)(2)(ii).

1. Consumer's name. Section 1006.34(c)(2)(ii) provides, in part, that validation information includes the consumer's name. To satisfy the requirement to provide this validation information, a debt collector must disclose the version of the consumer's name that the debt collector reasonably determines is the most complete and accurate version of the name about which the debt collector has knowledge. A debt collector does not disclose the most complete and accurate version of the consumer's name if the debt collector omits known name information in a manner that creates a false, misleading, or confusing impression about the consumer's identity. For example, assume the creditor provides the consumer's first name, middle name, last name, and name suffix to the debt collector. In this scenario, the debt collector would reasonably determine that the most complete and accurate version of the consumer's name about which the debt collector has knowledge includes the first name, middle name, last name, and name suffix. If the debt collector omits any of this information, the debt collector has not satisfied the requirement to provide the consumer's name pursuant to §1006.34(c)(2)(ii).

Paragraph 34(c)(2)(iii).

1. Creditor's name. Section 1006.34(c)(2)(iii) provides that, if a debt collector is collecting debt related to a consumer financial product or service as defined in §1006.2(f), validation information includes the name of the creditor to whom the debt was owed on the itemization date. Pursuant to §1006.34(c)(2)(iii), a debt collector may disclose this creditor's trade or doing-business-as name, instead of its legal name.

Paragraph 34(c)(2)(iv).

1. Account number truncation. Section 1006.34(c)(2)(iv) provides that validation information includes the account number, if any, associated with the debt on the itemization date, or a truncated version of that number. If a debt collector uses a truncated account number, the account number must remain recognizable. For example, a debt collector may truncate a credit card account number so that only the last four digits are provided.

Paragraph 34(c)(2)(v).

1. Creditor's name. Section 1006.34(c)(2)(v) provides that validation information includes the name of the creditor to whom the debt currently is owed. A debt collector may disclose this creditor's trade or doing-business-as name, instead of its legal name.

Paragraph 34(c)(2)(vii).

1. Amount of the debt on the itemization date. Section 1006.34(c)(2)(vii) provides that validation information includes the amount of the debt on the itemization date. The amount of the debt on the itemization date includes any fees, interest, or other charges owed as of that date.

Paragraph 34(c)(2)(viii).

1. Itemization of the debt. Section 1006.34(c)(2)(viii) provides that validation information includes an itemization of the current amount of the debt reflecting interest, fees, payments, and credits since the itemization date. If providing a validation notice, a debt collector must include fields in the notice for all of these items even if none of the items have been assessed or applied to the debt since the itemization date. A debt collector may indicate that the value of a required field is “0,” “none,” or may state that no interest, fees, payments, or credits have been assessed or applied to the debt; a debt collector may not leave a required field blank.

2. Itemization required by other applicable law. If a debt collector is required by other applicable law to provide an itemization of the current amount of the debt with the validation information, the debt collector may comply with §1006.34(c)(2)(viii) by disclosing the itemization required by other applicable law in lieu of the itemization described in §1006.34(c)(2)(viii), if the itemization required by other applicable law is substantially similar to the itemization that appears on Model Form B-1 in appendix B to this part.

3. Itemization on a separate page. Section 1006.34(c)(2)(viii) provides that a debt collector may disclose the itemization of the current amount of the debt on a separate page provided in the same communication with a validation notice if the debt collector includes on the validation notice, where the itemization would have appeared, a statement referring to that separate page. A debt collector may comply with the requirement to refer to the separate page by, for example, including on the validation notice the statement, “See the enclosed separate page for an itemization of the debt,” situated next to the information about the current amount of the debt required by §1006.34(c)(2)(ix).

4. Debt collectors collecting multiple debts. A debt collector who combines multiple debts on a single validation notice complies with §1006.34(c)(2)(viii) by disclosing either a single, cumulative itemization on the validation notice or a separate itemization of each debt on a separate page or pages provided in the same communication as the validation notice.

Paragraph 34(c)(2)(ix).

1. Current amount of the debt. Section 1006.34(c)(2)(ix) provides that validation information includes the current amount of the debt (i.e., the amount as of when the validation information is provided). For residential mortgage debt subject to Regulation Z, 12 CFR 1026.41, a debt collector may comply with the requirement to provide the current amount of the debt by providing the consumer the total balance of the outstanding mortgage, including principal, interest, fees, and other charges.

2. Debt collectors collecting multiple debts. A debt collector who combines multiple debts on a single validation notice complies with §1006.34(c)(2)(ix) by disclosing on the validation notice a single cumulative figure that is the sum of the current amount of all the debts.

34(c)(3) Information about consumer protections.

Paragraph 34(c)(3)(v).

1. Electronic communication media. Section 1006.34(c)(3)(v) provides that, if the debt collector provides the validation notice electronically, validation information includes a statement explaining how a consumer can, as described in paragraphs (c)(4)(i) and (ii) of this section, dispute the debt or request original-creditor information electronically. A debt collector may provide the information required by §1006.34(c)(3)(v) by including the statements, “We accept disputes electronically at,” using that phrase or a substantially similar phrase, followed by an email address or website portal that a consumer can use to take the action described in §1006.34(c)(4)(i), and “We accept original creditor information requests electronically,” using that phrase or a substantially similar phrase, followed by an email address or website portal that a consumer can use to take the action described in §1006.34(c)(4)(ii). If a debt collector accepts electronic communications from consumers through more than one medium, such as by email and through a website portal, the debt collector is required to provide information regarding only one of these media but may provide information on any additional media.

34(c)(4) Consumer-response information.

1. Prompts. If the validation information is provided in writing or electronically, a prompt required by §1006.34(c)(4) may be formatted as a checkbox as in Model Form B-1 in appendix B to this part.

34(c)(5) Special rule for certain residential mortgage debt.

1. In general. Section 1006.34(c)(5) provides that, for residential mortgage debt, if a periodic statement is required under Regulation Z, 12 CFR 1026.41, at the time a debt collector provides the validation notice, a debt collector need not provide the validation information required by §1006.34(c)(2)(vi) through (viii) if the debt collector provides the consumer, in the same communication with the validation notice, a copy of the most recent periodic statement provided to the consumer under 12 CFR 1026.41(b), and the debt collector includes on the validation notice, where the validation information required by paragraphs (c)(2)(vi) through (viii) of this section would have appeared, a statement referring to that periodic statement. A debt collector may comply with the requirement to refer to the periodic statement in the validation notice by, for example, including on the validation notice the statement, “See the enclosed periodic statement for an itemization of the debt.”

Official Interpretation

34(d) Form of validation information.

34(d)(2) Safe harbor.

1. In general. A debt collector who provides a validation notice that is neither a notice described in §1006.34(d)(2)(i) or (ii), nor a substantially similar notice as described in §1006.34(d)(2)(iii), does not receive a safe harbor for compliance with the information and form requirements of §1006.34(c) and (d)(1).

34(d)(2)(i) In general.

1. Disclosure required by §1006.18(e). Section 1006.18(e)(1) requires a debt collector to disclose in its initial communication that the debt collector is attempting to collect a debt and that any information obtained will be used for that purpose. Section 1006.18(e)(2) requires a debt collector to disclose in each subsequent communication that the communication is from a debt collector. Model Form B-1 in appendix B to this part includes the disclosure required by §1006.18(e)(1). A debt collector who uses Model Form B-1 to provide a validation notice as described in §1006.34(a)(1)(i)(B) may replace the disclosure required by §1006.18(e)(1) with the disclosure required by §1006.18(e)(2) without losing the safe harbor described in §1006.34(d)(2). See comment 34(c)(1)-1 for further guidance related to providing the disclosure required by §1006.18(e) on a validation notice.

34(d)(2)(iii) Substantially similar form.

1. Substantially similar form. Pursuant to §1006.34(d)(2)(iii), a debt collector who uses Model Form B-1 as described in §1006.34(d)(2)(i) may make changes to the form and retain the safe harbor for compliance with the information and form requirements of §1006.34(c) and (d)(1) provided that the form remains substantially similar in substance, clarity, and meaningful sequence to Model Form B-1. Permissible changes include, for example:

i. Modifications to remove language that could suggest liability for the debt if such language is not applicable. For example, if a debt collector sends a validation notice to a person who is authorized to act on behalf of the deceased consumer's estate (see comment 34(a)(1)-1), and that person is not liable for the debt, the debt collector may use the name of the deceased consumer instead of “you”;

ii. Relocating the consumer-response information required by §1006.34(c)(4) to facilitate mailing;

iii. Adding barcodes or QR codes, as long as the inclusion of such items does not violate §1006.38(b);

iv. Adding the date the form is generated; and

v. Embedding hyperlinks, if delivering the form electronically.

34(d)(3) Optional disclosures.

34(d)(3)(i) Telephone contact information.

1. In general. Section 1006.34(d)(3)(i) permits a debt collector to include telephone contact information. Telephone contact information may include, for example, a telephone number as well as the times that the debt collector accepts consumer telephone calls.

34(d)(3)(iv) Disclosures under applicable law.

34(d)(3)(iv)(A) Disclosures on the reverse of the validation notice.

1. In general. Section 1006.34(d)(3)(iv)(A) permits, in relevant part, a debt collector to include on the reverse of the validation notice any disclosures that are specifically required by, or that provide safe harbors under, applicable law. If a debt collector provides a validation notice in the body of an email, the debt collector may, in lieu of including the disclosures permitted by §1006.34(d)(3)(iv)(A) on the reverse of the validation notice, include them in the same communication below the content of the validation notice. Disclosures permitted by §1006.34(d)(3)(iv)(A) include, for example, specific disclosures required by Federal, State, or municipal statutes or regulations, and specific disclosures required by judicial or administrative decisions or orders, including administrative consent orders. Such disclosures could include, for example, time-barred debt disclosures and disclosures that the current amount of the debt may increase or vary due to interest, fees, or other charges, provided that such disclosures are specifically required by applicable law.

2. Statement referring to disclosures. If a debt collector includes disclosures pursuant to §1006.34(d)(3)(iv)(A), the debt collector must include a statement on the front of the validation notice referring to those disclosures. A debt collector may comply with the requirement to refer to the disclosures by including on the front of the validation notice the statement, “Notice: See reverse side for important information,” or a substantially similar statement. If, as permitted by comment 34(d)(3)(iv)(A)-1, a debt collector places the disclosures below the content of the validation notice, the debt collector may comply with the requirement to refer to the disclosures by stating, “Notice: See below for important information,” or a substantially similar statement.

34(d)(3)(iv)(B) Disclosures on the front of the validation notice.

1. In general. Section 1006.34(d)(3)(iv)(B) provides, in relevant part that, if a debt collector is collecting time-barred debt, the debt collector may include on the front of the validation notice any time-barred debt disclosure that is specifically required by, or that provides a safe harbor under, applicable law, provided that applicable law specifies the content of the disclosure. For example, if applicable State law requires a debt collector who is collecting time-barred debt to disclose to the consumer that the law limits how long a consumer can be sued on a debt and that the debt collector cannot or will not sue the consumer to collect it, the debt collector may include that disclosure on the front of the validation notice. See §1006.26(a)(2) for the definition of time-barred debt. For purposes of §1006.34(d)(3)(iv)(B), time-barred debt disclosures may include disclosures about revival of debt collectors' right to bring a legal action to enforce the debt.

34(d)(3)(vi) Spanish-language translation disclosures.

Paragraph 34(d)(3)(vi)(A).

1. Supplemental information in Spanish. Section 1006.34(d)(3)(vi)(A) permits a debt collector to include supplemental information in Spanish that specifies how a consumer may request a Spanish-language validation notice. For example, a debt collector may include a statement in Spanish that a consumer can request a Spanish-language validation notice by telephone or email, if the debt collector accepts consumer requests through those communication media.

Paragraph 34(d)(3)(vii).

1. Merchant brand. Section 1006.34(d)(3)(vii) permits a debt collector to include the merchant brand, if any, associated with debt. For example, assume that a debt collector is attempting to collect a consumer's credit card debt. The credit card was issued by ABC Bank and was co-branded XYZ Store. “XYZ Store” is the merchant brand.

2. Affinity brand. Section 1006.34(d)(3)(vii) permits a debt collector to include the affinity brand, if any, associated with the debt. For example, assume that a debt collector is attempting to collect a consumer's credit card debt. The credit card was issued by ABC Bank, and the logo for the College of Columbia appears on the credit card. “College of Columbia” is the affinity brand.

3. Facility name. Section 1006.34(d)(3)(vii) permits a debt collector to include the facility name, if any, associated with the debt. For example, assume that a debt collector is attempting to collect a consumer's medical debt. The medical debt relates to a treatment that the consumer received at ABC Hospital. “ABC Hospital” is the facility name.

Official Interpretation

34(e) Translation into other languages.

1. Safe harbor for complete and accurate translation. Section 1006.34(e) provides, among other things, that, if a debt collector sends a consumer a validation notice translated into a language other than English, the translation must be complete and accurate. The language of a validation notice that a debt collector obtains from the Bureau's website is considered a complete and accurate translation. Debt collectors are permitted to use other validation notice translations if they are complete and accurate.

Official Interpretation

Section 1006.38—Disputes and Requests for Original-Creditor Information

1. In writing. Section 1006.38 contains requirements related to a dispute or request for the name and address of the original creditor timely submitted in writing by the consumer. A consumer has disputed the debt or requested the name and address of the original creditor in writing for purposes of § 1006.38(c) or (d)(2) if the consumer, for example:

i. Mails the written dispute or request to the debt collector;

ii. Returns to the debt collector the consumer-response form that §1006.34(c)(4) requires to appear on the validation notice and indicates on the form the dispute or request;;

iii. Provides the dispute or request to the debt collector using a medium of electronic communication through which the debt collector accepts electronic communications from consumers, such as an email address or a website portal; or

iv. Delivers the written dispute or request in person or by courier to the debt collector.

2. Interpretation of the E-SIGN Act. Comment 38–1.ii constitutes the Bureau’s interpretation of section 101 of the E-SIGN Act as applied to section 809(b) of the FDCPA. Under this interpretation, section 101(a) of the E-SIGN Act enables a consumer to satisfy through an electronic request the requirement in section 809(b) of the FDCPA that the consumer’s notification of the debt collector be “in writing.” Further, because the consumer may only use a medium of electronic communication through which a debt collector accepts electronic communications from consumers, section 101(b) of the E-SIGN Act is not contravened.

3. Deceased consumers. If the debt collector knows or should know that the consumer is deceased, and if the consumer has not previously disputed the debt or requested the name and address of the original creditor, a person who is authorized to act on behalf of the deceased consumer's estate operates as the consumer for purposes of §1006.38. In such circumstances, to comply with §1006.38(c) or (d)(2), respectively, a debt collector must respond to a request for the name and address of the original creditor or to a dispute timely submitted in writing by a person who is authorized to act on behalf of the deceased consumer's estate.

Official Interpretation

38(a) Definitions.

38(a)(1) Duplicative dispute.

1. Substantially the same. Section 1006.38(a)(1) provides that a dispute is a duplicative dispute if, among other things, the dispute is substantially the same as a dispute previously submitted by the consumer in writing within the validation period for which the debt collector has already satisfied the requirements of § 1006.38(d)(2)(i). A later dispute can be substantially the same as an earlier dispute even if the later dispute does not repeat verbatim the language of the earlier dispute.

2. New and material information. Section 1006.38(a)(1) provides that a dispute that is substantially the same as a dispute previously submitted by the consumer in writing within the validation period for which the debt collector has already satisfied the requirements of § 1006.38(d)(2)(i) is not a duplicative dispute if the consumer provides new and material information to support the dispute. Information is new if the consumer did not provide the information when submitting an earlier dispute. Information is material if it is reasonably likely to change the verification the debt collector provided or would have provided in response to the earlier dispute. The following example illustrates the rule:

i. ABC debt collector is collecting a debt from a consumer and sends the consumer a validation notice. In response, the consumer submits a written dispute to ABC debt collector within the validation period asserting that the consumer does not owe the debt. The consumer does not include any information in support of the dispute. Pursuant to § 1006.38(d)(2)(i), ABC debt collector provides the consumer a copy of verification of the debt. The consumer then sends a cancelled check showing the consumer paid the debt. The cancelled check is new and material information.

Official Interpretation

38(d) Disputes.

38(d)(2) Response to disputes.

Paragraph 38(d)(2)(ii).

1. Duplicative dispute notice. Section 1006.38(d)(2)(ii) provides that, in the case of a dispute that a debt collector reasonably determines is a duplicative dispute, the debt collector must cease collection of the debt, or any disputed portion of the debt, until the debt collector either notifies the consumer that the dispute is duplicative (§ 1006.38(d)(2)(ii)(A)) or provides a copy either of verification of the debt or of a judgment to the consumer (§ 1006.38(d)(2)(ii)(B)). If the debt collector notifies the consumer that the dispute is duplicative, § 1006.38(d)(2)(ii)(A) requires that the notice provide a brief statement of the reasons for the debt collector’s determination that the dispute is duplicative and refer the consumer to the debt collector’s response to the earlier dispute. A debt collector complies with the requirement to provide a brief statement of the reasons for its determination if the notice states that the dispute is substantially the same as an earlier dispute submitted by the consumer and the consumer has not included any new and material information in support of the earlier dispute. A debt collector complies with the requirement to refer the consumer to the debt collector’s response to the earlier dispute if the notice states that the debt collector responded to the earlier dispute and provides the date of that response.

Official Interpretation

42(a) Sending required disclosures.

42(a)(1) In general.

1. Relevant factors. Section 1006.42(a)(1) provides, in part, that a debt collector who sends disclosures required by the Act or this part in writing or electronically must, among other things, do so in a manner that is reasonably expected to provide actual notice. In determining whether a debt collector has complied with this requirement, relevant factors include whether the debt collector:

i. Identified the purpose of the communication by including, in the subject line of an electronic communication transmitting the disclosure, the name of the creditor to whom the debt currently is owed or allegedly is owed and one additional piece of information identifying the debt, other than the amount, such as a truncated account number; the name of the original creditor; the name of any store brand associated with the debt; the date of sale of a product or service giving rise to the debt; the physical address of service; and the billing or mailing address on the account;

ii. Permitted receipt of notifications of undeliverability from communications providers, monitored for any such notifications, and treated any such notifications as precluding a reasonable expectation of actual notice for that delivery attempt; and

iii. Identified itself as the sender of the communication by including a business name that the consumer would be likely to recognize, such as the name included in the notice described in § 1006.6(d)(4)(ii)(C), or the name that the debt collector has used in a prior limited-content message left for the consumer or in an email message sent to the consumer.

2. Notice of undeliverability. A debt collector who sends a required disclosure in writing or electronically and who receives a notice that the disclosure was not delivered has not sent the disclosure in a manner that is reasonably expected to provide actual notice under § 1006.42(a)(1).

3. Safe harbor for notices sent by mail. Subject to comment 42(a)(1)–2, a debt collector satisfies § 1006.42(a)(1) if the debt collector mails a printed copy of a disclosure to the consumer’s last known address, unless the debt collector, at the time of mailing, knows or should know that the consumer does not currently reside at, or receive mail at, that location.

4. Effect of consumer opt out. If a consumer has opted out of debt collection communications to a particular email address or telephone number by, for example, following the instructions provided pursuant to § 1006.6(e), then a debt collector cannot use that email address or telephone number to send required disclosures.

Official Interpretation

Section 1006.100—Record Retention

1. Three-year retention period. Section 1006.100 requires a debt collector to maintain records that are evidence of compliance or noncompliance with the FDCPA and this part starting on the date that the debt collector begins collection activity on a debt until three years after the debt collector’s last collection activity on the debt or, in the case of telephone call recordings, until three years after the dates of the telephone calls. Nothing in § 1006.100 prohibits a debt collector from retaining records that are evidence of compliance or noncompliance with the FDCPA and this part for more than three years after the applicable date.

Official Interpretation

100(a) In general

1. Records that evidence compliance. Section 1006.100(a) provides, in part, that a debt collector must retain records that are evidence of compliance or noncompliance with the FDCPA and this part. Thus, under § 1006.100(a), a debt collector must retain records that evidence that the debt collector performed the actions and made the disclosures required by the FDCPA and this part, as well as records that evidence that the debt collector refrained from conduct prohibited by the FDCPA and this part. If a record is of a type that could evidence compliance or noncompliance depending on the conduct of the debt collector that is revealed within the record, then the record is one that is evidence of compliance or noncompliance and the debt collector must retain it. Such records include, but are not limited to, records that evidence that the debt collector’s communications and attempts to communicate in connection with the collection of a debt complied (or did not comply) with the FDCPA and this part. For example, a debt collector must retain:

i. Telephone call logs as evidence of compliance or noncompliance with the prohibition against harassing telephone calls in § 1006.14(b)(1); and

ii. Copies of documents provided to consumers as evidence that the debt collector provided the information required by §§ 1006.34 and 1006.38 and met the delivery requirements of § 1006.42.

2. No requirement to create additional records. A debt collector need not create and maintain additional records, for the sole purpose of evidencing compliance, that the debt collector would not have created in the ordinary course of its business in the absence of the record retention requirement set forth in § 1006.100(a). For example, § 1006.100(a) does not require a debt collector to create call logs showing that it has not attempted to communicate with any consumers at times that the consumers designated as inconvenient. However, if the debt collector maintains call logs, the call logs are evidence of compliance or noncompliance with the FDCPA and this part and the collector must retain them.

3. Methods of retaining evidence. Section 1006.100(a) does not require a debt collector to retain actual paper copies of documents. Records may be retained by any method that reproduces the records accurately (including computer programs) and that ensures that the debt collector can easily access the records (including a contractual right to access records possessed by another entity).

4. When the three-year record retention clock starts to run. Section 1006.100(a) provides, in part, that a debt collector must retain records that are evidence of compliance or noncompliance until three years after the debt collector’s last collection activity on a debt. An event such as the debt collector transferring the debt for consideration to another party would start the running of the debt collector’s three-year record retention clock with respect to the debt, provided that the transfer of the debt represents the debt collector’s last collection activity on the debt. In contrast, the debt’s discharge in bankruptcy, or the consumer’s curing of default on the debt, would not represent the time at which the three-year record-retention clock starts to run if the debt collector continues collection activity on the debt after that time, which might occur when the debt is secured and an enforceable lien on the collateral that secured the debt survives the bankruptcy discharge (and collection activity pursuant to the lien continues after the discharge).

Official Interpretation

100(b) Special rule for telephone call recordings.

1. Recorded telephone calls. Nothing in § 1006.100 requires a debt collector to record telephone calls. However, if a debt collector records telephone calls, the recordings are evidence of compliance or noncompliance with the FDCPA and this part, and, under § 1006.100(b), the debt collector must retain the recording of each such telephone call for three years after the date of the call.

Official Interpretation

Section 1006.104—Relation to State Laws

1. State law disclosure requirements. The Act and the corresponding provisions of Regulation F do not annul, alter, or affect, or exempt any person subject to these requirements from complying with a disclosure requirement under applicable State law that describes additional protections under State law that are not inconsistent with the Act and Regulation F. A disclosure required by State law is not inconsistent with the FDCPA or Regulation F if the disclosure describes a protection that such law affords any consumer that is greater than the protection provided by the FDCPA or Regulation F.