When Tellers Are Targeted -- Part II
A report by BOL Gurus Gayla Sherry, Barry Thompson, and Dana Turner
In Part I of our article "When Tellers Are Targeted", we explained that a new regulatory alert says organized gangs are using coercion and threats of bodily harm to persuade individuals to assist them in fraud schemes. We offered tips for protecting current tellers and spotting potential gang members applying for teller jobs.
In this installment, three additional BOL Gurus share their thoughts.
From BOL Guru Gayla Sherry:
The key to handling such awful issues (that I wish we didn't even have to talk about!) is leadership. As you know, tellers are often the lowest paid and least recognized of anyone in the bank. If the bank leadership (including supervisors) can begin to recognize the tremendous workload that tellers have, and adhere to sound principles of leadership, it will go a long way toward deterring tellers from such activities:
- Recruiting and interviewing, including valid background checks and reference checking
- Clear communication of expectations
- Training - beyond handing the teller the teller manual; hands-on training, including discussion about fraud and criminal activities; in this setting, it can be communicated candidly without frightening the tellers
- Frequent review of work - not in a micro-managed way, but as a "partner" in helping tellers with their job responsibilities
- Ongoing communication - if the teller is properly hired, trained and believes he/she works in an open communication environment; there is higher probability of alerting the supervisor if something suspicious does happen
- Good relationships with law enforcement and security officials, including FBI, OSBI, local law enforcement etc.
From BOL Guru Barry Thompson:
I had a case like this reported to me by a financial institution in a midwest state. It seems they had a break-in by someone who knew access codes, etc., and they thought the information was given by a teller living with a gang member. After making several telephone calls on this issue, I've discovered gang-related teller activity in three other states.
Communication is important, but we must have a system in place to allow tellers and others to report directly to the security officer. However, many tellers won't do this as they don't want to point fingers or become involved in the potential repercussions if nothing is wrong. Later, when evidence of the problem surfaces, tellers will say, "I thought so but didn't want to say anything."
When a bank's Security Officer has another title -- either senior officer or junior officer -- a gulf is created between front line staff and that person. I bridged that gap by creating a close bond with my immediate staff and having them be the bridge between front line and myself. Many times the problems were discussed with my staff to determine if it was important enough to report to me. A path must be designed to enable the front line staff to communicate with the appropriate person.
The second method that is really a great operational device is a special telephone number that staff can call. This method is totally anonymous and the message can be left on an answering machine. Management must never acknowledge what the message was or who may have left it. One bank at my seminars lastsweek told that over 50% of their cases were coming from this type of tip line.
From BOL Guru Dana Turner:
This isn't the first time that I've heard of this effort -- but it's the first time I've heard it attributed to an organized gang. And this problem isn't just about tellers . . .
Crooks have been tracking bank employees forever -- and the criminal intelligence network is SO much better that ours. Crooks follow employees to restaurants and shopping centers -- and other places where a significant people gathering is likely. Sometimes the crooks simply approach employees and offer to share the proceeds. Sometimes they "romance" them and develop relationships. Sometimes they learn "dirty little secrets" and use them to convince an employee to help.
Please advise employees to contact the Security Officer immediately if any of these types of contacts occur -- and the local law enforcement agency, independently. The Security Officer needs the information to secure the work environment appropriately. The agency will likely want the employee to participate in a "sting" operation.
First published on BankersOnline.com 5/6/02